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IN his famous article on "Frolic and Detour,"' the late Dean Young B.
Smith suggested that the problem of determining the "scope-of-employment"
could be solved by determining the scope of "zones of risk" which entrepre-
neurs could foresee were incident to their businesses. Professor Ehrenzweig
has recently taken much the same approach to the question of enterprise lia-
bility in conflict of laws. 2 He has suggested that choice-of-law problems in
that context can be solved by rejecting the laws of those jurisdictions which
were not "foreseeable and insurable" and against which, therefore, enterpre-
neurs could not have been expected to insure.
The zone-of-risk approach is based upon the "entrepreneur theory," a theory
first publicized in this country by Dean Smith,3 and more fully developed by
Douglas. 4 Douglas pointed out that enterprise liability had managerial as well
as financial functions. That is, not only could the entrepreneur insure and
spread the risk, but he could also seek to minimize the loss or prevent it alto-
gether. The zone-of-risk approach, however, is premised only upon the insur-
ance and risk-spreading function of enterprise liability. It is the purpose of
this article to investigate these insurance and risk spreading functions and to
discover whether they provide a good prescriptive basis for legal theory.
Dean Smith's article announcing the entrepreneur theory was part of a con-
tinuing critique. Holmes had disparaged vicarious liability as contrary to com-
mon sense.5 Baty agreed. He found that nine justifications had been advanced
for it. Eight of these, he argued, were false. Each rationale failed to cover a
situation in which the law, nevertheless, imposed vicarious liability. "In hard
fact," he concluded, "the real reason for employers' liability is the ninth: the
damages are taken from a deep pocket. ' 6 Though this was the reason, it could
not be justified. Baty could find no justice in respondeat superior.
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Time has not been kind to Mr. Baty. Holmes' laurels are in other fields.
Vicarious liability is as firmly entrenched in the law as if Baty and Holmes
had been silent. And the justice of enterprise liability is now unquestioned,
though the proper scope of such liability is still a matter of concern.
The entrepreneur theory is an important cornerstone of this modern view.
As Dean Smith said, "[T]he justification for making the master liable for his
servant's unauthorized torts is the desire to include in the costs of operation
inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and
thus distribute the burden among those bienefited by the enterprise ...."-7 A
different Smith put it more picturesquely: "business should pay its passage." s
Enterprise theorists observe that enterprise liability causes little business dis-
location while, at the same time, it does important service by repairing injured
limbs, replacing lost breadwinners, and making livable the invalid lives of in-
dustry's victims. The entrepreneur can avoid the shock effects of individual
judgments by building a fund to pay them or by purchasing insurance. Since
his competitors will have to do likewise no one suffers a competitive disad-
vantage. In this view the cost of insurance or funding is one of the regular
costs of businesses and, as such, can be passed on to customers. In short, a
victim's loss is shifted to one better able to bear it, and thence spread on to
the customers who benefit from the productive activity.9 It is proper that they
take the burden with the benefits. And, furthermore, since each customer's
proportionate share is quite small, they can sustain the burden easily, whereas
the original victim could not.10
It has been observed that liability in family automobile cases can be justi-
fied along similar lines. Heads of households must insure to protect family as-
sets from judgment execution. Insurance here spreads the expense of auto-
mobile casualties among the class of car owners, those who benefit from auto-
motive transportation. Families who own cars, then, take their share of the
burden of automotive transportation along with its benefits. While a household
is not usually considered an "enterprise," it is an economic unit providing ser-
vice to its members, and Professor Ehrenzweig has considered the family auto-
mobile argument to be'an aspect of the entrepreneur theory." Though some
consider the term "entrepreneur" a misnomer,12 in this context it is a very
perceptive analogy.
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Clearly, we must accept the functional observations upon which the entre-
preneur theory rests. Shock losses are spread by way of insurance and through
the channels of commerce, resulting in a net social gain. There are, of course,
exceptions. Enterprise liability will not be beneficial in every case. A teenager
may negligently collide the family car with a parked Standard Oil truck, in
which case a judgment in favor of Standard Oil will shift a loss from one
quite able to spread it. But since the family has liability insurance the process
is not a complete evil. The loss will still be spread, and that is the main thing.
The fact that the monetary outlay is almost twice the actual loss, because it
includes the cost of the insurance company's operations,"3 is an evil; but that
increment is itself spread so thinly over the class of insured car owners that
it is not a great evil.
One evil, however, may be greater. The shock loss of a large judgment can-
not always be spread. It may, rather, destroy the financial integrity of a busi-
ness or household enterprise. If the enterprise is uninsured and has no cash
reserve, a judgment may ruin the business or may leave a family with only its
exempt assets. The same result, of course, is possible if a judgment exceeds
the maximum of the insurance policy or the reserve. Can the entrepreneur
theory justify the harsh results in such cases? The answer given is that the
entrepreneur should have adequately funded or insured. The entrepreneur
must make provision for the costs of his enterprise or suffer financial failure.
The law makes the risk of enterprise liability a cost of the enterprise. The
entrepreneur who does not make provision for this cost should fail, just as one
who does not provide for his labor cost or for interest on his borrowed capital
will be put out of business. As Professor Ehrenzweig puts it, the law should
not concern itself with the uninsured entrepreneur, but should decree liability
in areas where "the defendant could reasonably be expected to carry such in-
surance. Not insurance, itself, obligates, but 'Assurabilit6 Oblige.' "14
It is from this point that the zone-of-risk analysis proceeds. If the law re-
quires an entrepreneur to insure the risks of his enterprise at his peril, then
the law must take care to limit liability to those risks against which the entre-
preneur can reasonably be expected to insure. But the entrepreneur can only
be expected to insure those risks which he can foresee are incident to his enter-
prise. Therefore, enterprise liability should be limited to that zone of risk which
the entrepreneur can anticipate. Fairness dictates that losses occurring beyond
the boundaries of that zone should not be attributed to the entrepreneur.
Thus, after adopting the entrepreneur theory, Dean Smith observed:
[Il]t does not follow that he [the entrepreneur] should be made respon-
sible for any and every tortious act which his servant may commit. To
make the entrepreneur responsible for acts of his employees in no way
connected with the enterprise would be undesirable because it would re-
13. See text at pp. 565-66 infra.




sult in including in the cost of production an item which economically
does not belong there. 15
Of course, here he envisaged an easy case, one not often litigated. The cases
he was primarily concerned with were those in which the acts of the employees
were somewhat connected with the enterprise. Typical of these are the truck
accident cases, in which the driver had used his employer's vehicle for a per-
sonal errand. "The writer," said Dean Smith, "would confine the master's
liability to deviations of the servant which, in view of what the servant was
employed to do, were probable."' 6 This led Dean Smith to the zone of risk.
[A]n enterprise involving the employment of chauffeurs to drive trucks
between particular points in New York City, does create a risk of injury
to persons outside the limits of the direct, or authorized route. This risk
results from the fact that chauffeurs frequently do make deviations from
the authorized route. On the other hand, it isn't probable that a chauffeur
who is told to drive from Times Square to Wall Street, will drive six or
seven miles in the opposite direction. Consequently, it could hardly be
said that an enterprise involving the employment of chauffeurs to drive
trucks around the lower part of New York thereby created a risk of in-
jury to people in the Bronx. . . . [I]n every case, there is a zone within
which there may fairly be said to exist a risk of injury to others in view
of what the servant was employed to do .... [I]njuries occurring with-
in the zone should be borne by the enterprise which caused the risk where
it appears that the affairs of the enterprise were a contributing cause of
the chauffeur's act in driving the car.17
Professor Ehrenzweig, in three articles all subtitled "Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under 'Foreseeable and Insurable Laws,' "18 has recently
used the same line of reasoning in connection with the choice-of-law problem
in conflicts of laws. Though the scope of enterprise liability is roughly the
same in all American jurisdictions, Professor Ehrenzweig has found three
differences with which to illustrate his thesis: guest statutes, automobile
owners' liability statutes, and laws imposing strict liability upon the sellers of
defective food. He dissents strongly from the Restatement view that the law
15. Smith, mupra note 1, at 461.
16. Id. at 724-25.
17. Id. at 728.
18. These articles, cited note 2 supra, are part of a series of articles by Professor
Ehrenzweig which have appeared in connection with the completion of his book on con-
flicts, the first part of which has already been published. EuRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1959). He has set out his basic approach to the choice-of-law problem in Ehrenzweig,
The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960). His
thesis is that the central problem of the law of conflicts is the ascertainment of a con-
venient forum. Once it is assured that cases will be heard only in convenient fora, courts
can then be expected to apply the lex fori in most cases. "[C]onflicts rules ... would ...
come into play primarily in determining whether the defendant would be unfairly dealt
with under the law of the forum...." Id. at 645. Apparently, these three articles are in-
tended to illustrate situations in which the lex fori should be displaced because "the de-
fendant would be unfairly dealt with under the law of the forum."
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of the place of the injury governs. 19 This may lead to liability not contemplated
by the entrepreneur. If the owner of a car garaged in a guest statute state
should have an accident in a nonguest statute state, the Restatement would
have the common law of the nonguest statute state govern the suit by the guest
against the owner, whether the case was brought in a guest statute state forum
or not. Professor Ehrenzweig retorts: "It seems unreasonable to compel the
host... to buy insurance against a liability that he might incur under the law
of a state possibly to be reached on a yet unplanned out-of-state trip."120 He
would allow the host to plea the guest statute in bar of liability. Under this
rule,
the host will or could arrange his [insurance] protection with a view to
[the guest statute of his own state] without fear of being subjected to a
broader liability in a common-law state. His insurer will or could cal-
culate his premium accordingly. And the prospective guest, aware of his
limited protection, will or could be expected to purchase his own accident
insurance.21
On the other hand, the driver of a car garaged in a nonguest statute state, who
injured his guest in a guest statute state, could not plea the statute in bar of
liability. His insurance premium was calculated to cover the risk of guest
claims.
The owner's liability statutes which concern Professor Ehrenzweig provide
that the owner-bailor of an automobile is liable for the negligence of his bailee
even if the bailee is not a servant of the bailor, provided the car is being used
with the bailor's permission. Connecticut, for instance, has such a law.
2
Massachusetts does not. Again Professor Ehrenzweig would condition lia-
bility upon the law against which the owner had insured.
'Insurable laws' include at least the law of the defendant's domicile (or,
in the automobile cases, the state where his car is permanently kept), the
law of the place of the accident, and probably the law of the plaintiff's
residence in this or a contiguous country. Among these laws, then, ...
the plaintiff should be able to choose by choosing his forum [which should
apply the lex fori]. But limits on the application of the lex fori are neces-
19. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934). This section invokes the law of
the "place of wrong." This has been interpreted to mean the place of the injury, rather
than the place of the substandard conduct. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 377.2, at 1287
(1935).
20. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in The Conflicts of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 794, 801
(1960).
21. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 603-04
(1960).
22. This statute only applies to car rental agencies. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-154
(1958). Similar statutes have been enacted in other states. Some states, however, have
owners' liability statutes which cover all owners. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 6106 (Supp. 1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-403 (1951); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 49-1404 (1948); MICH. Comp. LAws § 257.401 (Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
170.54 (1960); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 388.
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sary to exclude undesirable forum shopping. A Massachusetts plaintiff
injured in his own state by a car rented in a state equally lacking an
owners' liability law, should not be able to avail himself of the owners'
liability law of Connecticut by bringing suit in that state after acquiring
a mere transient jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . [T]he defendant
must be permitted to prove that Connecticut law was not one whose im-
pact on its operations could reasonably have been foreseen and insured
against-i.e., that its application to this particular case would be purely
fortuitous.2 3
In contrast, Professor Ehrenzweig considers the case of a Connecticut resi-
dent, victim of an accident in Massachusetts caused by a car rented from a
Massachusetts defendant. If suit were brought in Connecticut, Professor
Ehrenzweig would permit the case to be decided according to Connecticut
law; the Connecticut owner's liability statute would apply. Furthermore, the
plaintiff should not be deprived of this choice of invoking Connecticut law "by
being unable to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut [ ;] and
[he] must, in a Massachusetts court, be permitted to rely on Connecticut law
as one reasonably foreseeable and insurable by the defendant."24
To illustrate his point concerning products liability, Professor Ehrenzweig
chooses Ohio, which, in common with at least twenty-one other jurisdictions,
imposes strict liability upon vendors of defective food.25 He would impose
strict liability upon all Ohio producers, even if the plaintiff was domiciled in
one of the fourteen or more jurisdictions which adhere to the requirement that
negligence be shown, and regardless of whether he had purchased and con-
sumed the food in his home state. An Ohio producer, even if he markets inter-
state, can certainly foresee and insure against the impact of Ohio law. Also, a
non-Ohio producer who markets in Ohio would be subject to the Ohio rule
in a suit by one who purchased the food in Ohio, even if the plaintiff had to
bring the suit in another state to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. One
who markets in Ohio knowingly assumes the added burden of Ohio law; he
can foresee the risk and insure against it. However, a non-Ohio producer who
does not market in Ohio and has no reason to anticipate that his product will
be consumed there would not be subject to Ohio law. A traveler, then, who
purchased the product of such a producer in New York, but consumed it and
became ill in Ohio, could not claim the benefit of Ohio law, for Ohio law was
not "foreseeable and insurable" by the producer.26
In short, then, Professor Ehrenzweig, by following the line of argument
originally advanced by Dean Smith, has adopted a zone-of-foreseeable-laws
concept which parallels Dean Smith's zone-of-risk analysis of the scope of
23. Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Law's, 69" YAIE L.. 978, 988
(1960).
24. Ibid.
25. The jurisdictions are counted and classified in Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consamer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1107-10 (1960).
26. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960).
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employment. Both of these zones are defined by the extent of insurance cover-
age, or in the case of self-insurers the extent of foreseeable risk, for which
entrepreneurs can be expected to provide.
The Smith-Ehrenzweig method for defining the extent of entrepreneur re-
sponsibility does not, in my opinion, stand up under analysis. It suffers from
a number of related difficulties. First, it is based upon a mistaken concept of
risk. Second, it fails to take into account certain insurance practices dictated
by the nature of risk. Finally, it is tautological.
THE COST OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
The zone-of-risk approach confuses the concept of risk in general with the
concept of particular risks. A particular risk is important to one who wants
to avoid a specific loss. But the entrepreneur is not concerned with a specific
loss when he buys insurance or funds a reserve against enterprise liability.
He wants to know the aggregate cost of those losses that he fails to avoid and
for which he will be held liable. He is interested in the quantum of risk ex-
pressed in dollars and cents. He wants to know the cost, so that he can pro-
vide for it in an orderly manner.
The Actuarial Process
For this information, he must turn to an actuary.27 The actuary attempts
to estimate the total cost of risks arising from the business, but for this he
must make a number of assumptions. He first assumes that the immediate
future will be much like the recent past. Last year's plaintiff will not be in-
jured again next year, but someone much like him may well be. This assump-
tion is valid only for large aggregates. In a very large enterprise the total
number of claims will not vary much from year to year. It may be possible,
then, to predict the cost of paid claims for next year from the cost of those
made last year. The actuary might predict with reasonable accuracy the amount
of enterprise liability for next year for an unchanged enterprise, if the enter-
prise were large enough. For smaller enterprises he will have to lump together
the experience of a number of past years. His prediction in this case will not
be valid for the coming year alone, for the same factors which make the law
of averages not applicable to the most recent year alone also make it inappli-
27. I make no claim to expertise as an actuary. The following discussion of the
actuarial process is largely based upon three works: KULP, CASUALTY INSURANCE 458-
532 (3d ed. 1956) ; Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance
-Goals, Technics, and Limits, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PRO. 493 (1950) ; Stem, Current
Rate Making Procedures for Liability Insurance, in 53 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY
ACTUARIAL SOCIETY 112 (1956). I am further indebted to the actuaries of the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters who have been most kind in answering my many ques-
tions about the practice of their art and have made available their recent studies of prod-
ucts liability rates and Delaware automobile liability rates. The views here presented are
solely my own and are not necessarily those of the Bureau or any of its actuaries.
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cable to the single coming year. But the past three years, perhaps, can be used
to predict the loss for the coming three years, and it is not unreasonable to
say that the value of the risk for each of the three future years is really one
third of the total three-year-risk. 28 A surplus in one of those years is very like-
ly to be offset by fewer claims in others. A business with sufficient reserves,
or that business' insurer, can weather a storm of excess claims in some years,
and in the long run maintain the integrity of its reserves, if one third of the
probable three-year loss is set aside annually. A difficulty in prediction, how-
ever, arises from the fact that things will not be the same during the coming
three years as they were during the past three. Inflation may increase the size
of claims. A change in claim consciousness may change the frequency of claims.
If the past years indicate a trend, an assumption must be made that the trend
will continue, to some extent, into the coming period.2 9 Since all the actuary
is attempting to calculate is one third the probable three-year total, so that a
proper amount will be set aside during the coming year, this trend analysis
can be relied upon. A year hence, an analysis can be made to discover whether
the trend is continuing or not, and adjustments can be made in the amount to
be set aside for the next, overlapping, three-year period.
Of course, this description is unreal in a number of particulars. First, even
if we are going to calculate the amount of risk on the basis of one enterprise
alone, that risk will not have remained constant during the past three years
and cannot be expected to remain constant even during the next one or two
years. For one thing, the size of the business will probably change, bringing
with it a change in the amount of risk. Hence the actuary must derive a figure
for each type of risky activity according to the volume of that activity. That
is, he cannot figure merely the total amount of claims, but must calculate the
amount of claims per unit of "exposure." Industrial accident claims vary with
the size of the work force, automobile accident claims with the mileage
covered, products liability with the quantity of sales, and so on. Also, within
each of these categories the risk varies with the kind of activity. For instance,
products liability risks vary with the kind of product sold: bottled beer is
riskier than canned beer, as the risk of explosion and the problem of cleaning
28. In practice, one, two, three, or even five years' experience may be used. At one
time, five years was commonly used, but there is a chance that the added accuracy which
these additional years might supply will be counterbalanced by changed conditions. Ob-
viously, the most recent data is more indicative of the immediate future than is data as-
sembled a number of years ago.
It should be added that final data concerning recent years is not available. Last year's
automobile accidents have already occurred, but the total amount of damage is, as yet,
unknown. The final total of losses attributable to recent experience is projected, there-
fore, by estimating a "loss development factor": the ratio of the final total for a given
year to that reported as of the end of that year, or as of twelve or twenty-four (or any
other number) months after the end of that year. This factor is derived by comparing the
final reports for prior years with the earlier reports for those same years. Stern, mrpra
note 27, at 119-22.
29. See Stern, supra note 27, at 123,
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the containers are different; truck risks differ from car risks; miners are more
likely to be killed than clerks. Thus, the actuary must first subdivide enter-
prise activity in general into various kinds of claims: workmen's compensa-
tion, products liability, automobile liability, etc. Then each of these must be
further classified according to specific activity: brewer, five-and-ten, etc. And
then, for each class, the actuary must find an appropriate "unit of exposure"
-- one which not only varies with the amount of risky activity, but which is
also easily discovered from the books of the business. For example, while man-
hours might be the best unit for workmen's compensation, it would be difficult
to abstract from the books. Therefore, dollars of payroll is used instead.
Again, mileage might be best for automobiles and trucks, and in fact it is
sometimes used. But the more common measure is simply the number of
vehicles of each class, a rougher measure of automotive activity, but one more
easily determined. For products liability, the unit of exposure is usually $1000
gross receipts or sales. Where only one standardized product is involved, the
unit can be stated in terms of the articles sold. In department stores, the unit
is $1000 of sales, but the unit for sugar refiners is 10,000 pounds of sugar, for
tire manufacturers, 1000 tires. Sometimes compromises must be made. A
brewery's risk of poisoning its customers probably varies with the number of
gallons it sells, but this would be a poor measure for bottled beer, where the
explosion risk varies with the number of bottles. Hence the unit for bottled
beer is 10,000 bottles, but for beer in kegs it is 10,000 gallons.
By analyzing claims in relation to units of exposure, the actuary can ignore
the fact that the size of the enterprise under study has changed during the
years under study. Furthermore, his predictions will be useful to an entrepre-
neur who expects the size of his business to change during the next year. A
brewer will know the cost of risk per truck, per dollar of payroll, and per
bottle of beer.
Of course, the actuarial method described above would only work for a very
large enterprise. When the various classes of risk are so finely subdivided, the
amount of a particular enterprise's experience in each class can become so
small that the law of averages can no longer be applied to it. One robin does
not make a summer, and five paid claims do not indicate much about the level
of risk. In the language of actuaries, it is no longer "credible."
One technique, however, can be used to increase the "credibility" of the
data. While large claims are relatively infrequent, they greatly affect a simple
ratio of losses to exposure when they do occur. If, for example, claims average
around $1000 each, a business which had to pay one hundred claims ought to
show losses of around $100,000. But if one of those claims results in a verdict
of $100,000, the total losses will be almost doubled. The frequency of large
claims, however, can be considered to be the result of pure chance. Therefore,
in making his initial computation, the actuary reduces the size of large claims
to a relatively low figure, thus reducing the effect of such claims upon his cal-
culations. From this initial figure and on the basis of the anticipated frequency
of large claims, he can then project the actual amount of the risk. If by chance
[Vol. 70:554
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the particular experience being studied does not contain any large claims, he
is able in this manner to calculate what the entrepreneur's share of the large-
claim risk is-the amount he should nevertheless be setting aside to pay the
big claim which is probably going to crop up eventually. On the other hand,
if the particular experience is by chance overloaded with large claims, this
does not affect the actuary's calculations.
For instance, in calculating automobile liability and product liability rates
the actuary considers only the "basic limits" experience. He omits from his
calculations all "excess limits" claims by ignoring that part of any claim which
exceeds $5000. He is then able to evaluate the amount of "basic limits" risk.
From prior experience, involving a much greater amount of data, he knows
the ratio of basic limits risk to total risk. He can, therefore, project the total
risk from the basic limits risk.30 This technique relies primarily upon that
part of the given experience which is least subject to chance, that part which
includes fewer "long shots" and is hence more credible than the total experi-
ence. But this approach can be followed only by projecting the basic limits
figure thus derived according to a factor discovered from a study of a wider
group of experience. At this stage the actuary has started to bring in the ex-
perience of other entrepreneurs. 31
In general, however, the actuary must bring in the experience of others at
the very beginning. Even in using the above technique, which limits his con-
sideration to the least chancy part of the experience under study, the actuary
must have a considerable amount of data. In the automobile liability field, for
example, it is considered necessary to have experience involving at least 1084
losses before the experience can be judged completely credible. A lesser
amount of experience is not totally useless, but is weighed according to a slid-
30. This is an oversimplification because the actuary for an insurance company never
attempts to calculate the total risk. He always limits the amount per claim. In other
words, he does not project from basic limits to total risk; he projects from basic limits
($5000) to some higher figure, say $10,000, $100,000 or $300,000. For higher figures, of
course, the experience is less credible than for lower figures. Claims in the range from
$5,000 to $10,000 may be frequent enough so the ratio of that risk to the basic limits risk
can be easily determined, but claims above $100,000 are not frequent enough to permit a
reliable calculation. The upper reaches of excess limits risk, therefore, are determined by
projecting the lower figure according to laws of chance.
31. In calculating workmen's compensation rates, a slightly different technique is used.
Claims are divided into three categories: serious, nonserious, and medical, and pure pre-
miums are calculated for each. Serious claims are less frequent and less likely, therefore,
to be credible. Nonserious and medical claims, being more frequent, are more credible. Each
part of the experience is evaluated according to its credibility. See note 32 infra and accom-
panying text. This means that the actuary's final estimate of the nonserious and the medical
part of the risk is likely to be based upon recent experience, but his estimate of the serious
part of the risk will be merely an adjustment of estimates of prior years in the direction
indicated by the partially credible serious claims experience. See KIJLP, CASUALTY IN-
sURAxcE 472-73 (3d ed. 1956); Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casual-
ty Insurance-Goals Technics, and Limits, 15 LAw & CNTE4P, PROB. 493, 508 (1950).
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ing scale.32 An experience with one quarter of the losses has one half the
credibility. Thus, if there are only 271 losses the experience is said to have 50
per cent credibility, which means that the result will only be half-relied upon.
The practical meaning of this is that if an actuary had to rely upon such ex-
perience to change an existing rate of insurance he would make only half the
adjustment indicated. Similarly, if the experience had only forty losses per
year it would be considered 10 per cent credible, and he would make only one
tenth of the change indicated. Meager experience, then, can be used to adjust
a rate, though the actuary approaches the true rate somewhat the way Achilles
caught the Tortoise. His progress is not as unrelenting as Achilles', for the
small amounts of experience have too many chaotic factors. Experience in-
volving 271 claims a year would not indicate the true rate each year, so unlike
Achilles the actuary would not advance exactly half the true distance each
time.
Most entrepreneurs do not have 1084 automobile liability claims per year.
Very few, probably, have even forty. In order to amass data with sufficient
credibility to estimate the amount of risk involved the actuary must, therefore,
combine the experience of a number of entrepreneurs. He does this by estab-
lishing territories within which, he assumes, entrepreneurs are roughly the
same. In theory, the boundaries of these territories should be drawn along
functional lines, to separate urban from rural conditions, mountains from
plains, etc. In practice, many territories are bounded by city limits and county
lines. Large cities are often surrounded by a "suburban" territory which was
drawn along functional lines, but the recent growth of suburbs has made many
territories obsolete. It is difficult for the actuaries to revise these territories
because their data is categorized according to the present pattern of territories.
There is, therefore, an unavoidable lag between changing land-use patterns
and the revision of rate territories.
32. This scale is as follows:











1084 and over 100%
KULP, op. cit. supra at 478.
Different lines of insurance present different problems and have different standards
of credibility. Thus, for products liability, a similar table has been worked out, but 683
claims have been considered 100% credible. In workmen's compensation, credibility is
evaluated in terms of the total amount paid, rather than the number of claims. Since the
amount paid is somewhat related to the number of claims, credibility is indirectly a func-
tion of the number of claims. KuLP, op. cit. supra at 473.
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It is important to keep in mind that these territories are aggregates of as-
sureds, not aggregates of claimants or accidents. Thus, a claim against an
entrepreneur is allocated to his territory even if the accident giving rise to the
claim was outside the territory, the claimant resided outside the territory, or
suit was brought in a remote jurisdiction.
With such territories the actuary attempts to collect sufficient experience
from a group of entrepreneurs to be able to estimate the amount attributable
to each. He estimates the entire group's risk, and then assumes that each
member of the group is responsible for a share of this risk in proportion to
that member's share of the units of exposure in the group. This is valid only
if the group is entirely homogeneous. The actuary, therefore, would like to
subdivide territories and callings in order to make the group as small as pos-
sible. But as he does so the amount of experience decreases toward the point
of no credibility. He must strike a careful balance between homogeneity and
credibility. Furthermore, a multiplication of classifications complicates the
process of gathering and evaluating the experience.
[D]ue consideration . . . has to be given to the value of the information
to be obtained in relation to the expenditure in man hours and equipment
it takes to produce the data, and the ability of the companies and the
[rate making] Bureau to produce and process the reported data within
reasonable time limits.
3 3
Finally, territories must be reasonably easy to identify, so that agents can cal-
culate the rates on policies written. The actuary must, therefore, be content in
most cases with this grouping procedure, using quite large groups. The true
risk of a small entrepreneur cannot be calculated.
What is the figure, then, which the actuary derives? First, it is usually
based on a number of years' experience, so it is simply a fraction of the esti-
mated risk for a number of years. Second, it is usually based on the experi-
ence of a large group of entrepreneurs, so the rate per unit of exposure is a
fraction of the estimated total risk of those entrepreneurs, Third, it is based
upon the basic limits risk of those entrepreneurs, projected according to the
ratio of basic limits risk to the excess limits risk of a much larger group of
entrepreneurs. The actuary, then, rather than calculating an entrepreneur's
risk, attributes to him a fraction of a territorial group's risk, which is not even
that group's risk, but rather the product of a part of the group's basic limits
risk for the past few years times an excess limits risk factor which has been
derived from a still larger amount of experience.
These actuarial calculations yield what actuaries call the "pure premium"
per unit of exposure: i.e., the amount of losses which an insurer will attribute
to each such unit and which must be covered by the premiums he receives. Of
course, the gross premium must be larger than the total of "pure premiums."
The insurer is selling indemnification. It is hoped that the sum of pure pre-
miums will equal the sum of payments in indemnification; but insurance com-
33. Stern, .mipra note 27, at 115-16.
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panies cannot sell at cost. There must be a mark-up, or in actuarial terms an
"expense loading." This is accomplished by deciding what percentage of an
insurance company's gross income must go for profit and for such expenses
as agents' commissions, actuarial service, management, etc. This figure, ex-
pressed as a percentage, is termed the "expense ratio." Its compliment is the
"loss ratio." Together, they add up to 100 per cent. If the "loss ratio" is 55
per cent, then the rate must be set so that the "pure premium" is 55 per cent
of it. That is, the rate is the quotient of the "pure premium" divided by the
"loss ratio." This is the "manual rate," the rate which the small insured pays
when he purchases insurance.
Large enterprises, on the other hand, do not pay the manual rate. They
have meaningful experience of their own, and hence it is possible to assign
them individual rates. If their experience is better than the norm, they receive
some benefit through lower rates; but if their experience is worse, they will
feel some of the additional burden because their rates will be set above the
manual rates. The rates of most individually rated firms are only slightly dif-
ferent from the manual rates, however, because their experience is not suffi-
ciently large to be completely credible. Rather, they are charged a basic limits
rate which is a mean between the manual rate and the rate indicated by their
own experience. The mean point selected varies directly with the credibility
of their individual experience, so that the smaller the credibility, the closer
the rate charged approaches the manual rate and differs from the rate indicated
by the individual enterprise's experience. Since the credibility of most firm's
experience is relatively low, most individual rates do not differ greatly from
the manual rate.3 4
34. The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters' automobile liability plan for New
York State, for instance, is only applicable to enterprises with at least five vehicles (or
three buses) and which would, except for the plan, pay an annual premium of $1,000 or
more. Except for very large enterprises, those whose premium at manual rates would ex-
ceed $29,215 annually, the plan concerns only the basic limits premium. Since excess limits
premiums are a standard multiple of basic limits rates, however, any basic limits adjust-
ment changes the excess limits premium also. The plan, however, is not based upon all
basic limits experience, but only upon the even more credible experience below a ceiling
which varies with the size of the enterprise, from $1,850, for the smallest which qualifies,
on up. The credibility of the particular enterprise's experience can be deduced from the
following table of examples:









275,000 or more 100%
The rate charged is a weighted average between the rate indicated by the experience
and the manual rate. Thus, if a company's manual rate was $1696, the credibility of its
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This description of the actuarial process is necessarily overgeneralized, and
consequently it may be misleading.35 Before going further, therefore, it would
be well to describe more specifically the methods used by the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters in setting automobile liability and products liability
rates. The Bureau and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau set the majority
of rates in the nation. Their methods are very similar.36
Auto Liability Rates
Automobile liability insurance rates are made separately for three general
groups of risks: private passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and garages.
Passenger car rates are set by first determining the state-wide average basic
limits premium. This premium will not be paid by any car owner, but it is the
point of departure for the rate making process. The average premium is
derived from the experience of one year. In smaller states, where one year's
experience is correspondingly smaller, two years are used, with greater weight
being given the most recent year. The indicated average pure premium de-
duced from this experience is then adjusted for trend. The past number of
years have witnessed an increase in the size of claims. Nation-wide, the aver-
age bodily injury basic limits claim has increased from $663 in 1955 to $753
in 1959. The state's trend is projected, and the indicated average pure pre-
mium for basic limits is adjusted accordingly.3 7 Dividing this figure by the
proposed loss ratio, the Bureau derives the state-wide average basic limits
rate.
experience would be 15%. If its own experience indicated a rate of $1000, its final rate
would be .15 x 1000 plus .85 x 1696 or $1592. Simply stated, the entrepreneur would be
awarded 15% of the difference between his indicated rate and the "manual rate." A large
entrepreneur, one whose "basic limits" premium at manual rates was $9802, could claim
a credibility of 50% and thus receive half the benefit (or burden) of the difference be-
tween his indicated rate and the manual rate.
Experience rating plans are quite varied and are often complex. For a more complete
description of them see KuLP, op. cit. supra note 32, at 486-532.
35. Id. at 481.
36. Some companies make their own rates, or set their rates a fraction below the
Bureau rates because their selling cost, and hence their expense ratio, is less.
37. This trend analysis may be based in part upon the nationwide trend because the
state's experience is likely to lack complete credibility. Credibility criteria for trend
analysis must be higher than those used in other phases of rate making. Because trend is
discovered by comparing the average claim in a recent year with the average claim in a
previous one and then projecting into the future, slight errors in individual year's aver-
ages can cause a large error in the projection. If the errors in each average are in opposite
directions (e.g., 1958's average is slightly low and 1959's is slightly high), the errors will
be cumulative. Therefore, bodily injury trends require $7,500,000 total basic limits claims
a year for complete credibility. Property damage experience of $1,000,000 a year is also
fully credible. The trend for those states which fail to meet these standards is assumed
to lie between the state's indicated trend and the nationwide trend, weight being given to
the state's indicated trend in proportion to the credibility of its experience.
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Then, the average premium for each rating territory within the state is
determined. This is done by comparing the territory's experience for three
years with the state-wide experience for the same period in order to discover
how much more or less risky the territory is than the state in general. This
ratio, which is really the ratio of the state-wide average pure premium to the
territory average pure premium, is also the ratio between the state-wide aver-
age rate and the territory average rate, since all rates have the same loss ratio.
This ratio, then, times the indicated state-wide average premium, yields the
average premium for the territory. Of course, many territories lack fully cred-
ible experience, even when three years' experience is combined. In such cases
the indicated premium must be adjusted in the direction of the state-wide pre-
mium in proportion to the lack of credibility.3 8
One further adjustment is necessary. In most states there are nine classifi-
cations of private passenger car risks. Passenger cars used in business are in
class 3. Privately owned cars regularly driven by a male under 25 are in class
2A; but if the male under 25 also owns the car and is unmarried, the car is in
class 2C. Other individually owned cars are in class IA; unless they are used
to drive to work, in which case they are in 1B or 1C depending upon whether
the trip to work is less or more than ten miles. Finally, there are three special
classifications for farmers, 1AF, 2AF, and 2CF, which correspond to classes
1A, 2A, and 2C.
The relationship between the rates for these different classes has been
worked out on a percentage basis. That is, the riskiness of class 1A has been
compared to the riskiness of each other class on a substantially nation-wide
basis. Some states have not approved the plan, so their experience has not
been used. Furthermore, large cities have displayed a different pattern from
small cities and rural areas, so their experience, nation-wide, has been com-
puted separately. On the basis of this experience, it has been found that 1AF
automobiles (farmers) have 70 per cent of the risk of 1A automobiles. Class
3 risks are 150 per cent of 1A risks. The large city 2C risk is 310 per cent of
1A, but in rural and small city territories, it is 360 per cent of IA.
These factors, which are based upon experience from other states and other
territories, are then used to set the rates for each class in each territory. This
is done by first determining the 1A rate. The present ratio of the 1A rate to
the average rate in the territory under the previous rates is calculated. Since
38. Actually, the proposed average rate for the territory is never derived as such, but
it is implicit in the Bureau's calculations. The ratio of that rate to the state-wide rate is
derived by comparing the loss ratio for the territory with the loss ratio for the state as
a whole. Any lack of credibility in the territory's experience is compensated for by ad-
justing this ratio toward unity. This ratio times the proposed state-wide average pre-
mium gives the proposed average premium for the territory. These figures are not multi-
plied together, however, until after the differential between the territory's average pre-
mium and the class 1A premium is also worked out, as described below. Then all three
factors, the state-wide average premium, the ratio of the territory's experience to the state
as a whole, and the class 1A differential, are combined to yield the 1A rate.
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the percentage differentials between classes remain unchanged this ratio will
remain the same under the new rates. This ratio times the proposed average
rate for the territory will yield the new class 1A rate. The 1A rate thus de-
duced is then rounded off to the nearest dollar. The rates for the other classes
are then set by multiplying the established class rate differentials times the
rounded-off 1A rate; the rates for these other classes are then, in turn, rounded
off to the nearest dollar. Usually the rounding off cancels out, there being as
many upward as downward adjustments in each state's rates. However, the
total revenue which the proposed rates will bring in is compared with the
total revenue which a standard charge of the state-wide average manual rate
would yield; if the figures differ by more than 1 per cent adjustments are
made to reduce the difference.
The above calculation yields the basic limits rate for each territory and
classification. Excess limits rates are not separately computed. Instead, they are
set at a multiple of the basic limits rate. Generally, for passenger cars, insur-
ance providing up to $300,000 in coverage costs 160 per cent of the basic
limits rate. A table of such ratios has been calculated upon substantially
nation-wide experience, and it is used in all but four states. In these four
(Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Oklahoma) which have exhibited higher
excess limit losses, a separate table has been worked out.
The process for setting commercial vehicle rates is substantially the same.
However, the state-wide average is based upon the two years' experience, each
year having equal weight. The ratio of average territory rates to the average
state rate is based upon five years' experience instead of three. There are
eleven major classes, based upon the kind of business and the size of the
vehicle. Finally, there is a different excess limits table, with a special table for
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. As one would expect, the excess
limit differentials are higher for commercial vehicles than for passenger cars.
This method permits rates for very small classes which by themselves
would have experience of very little credibility. Each rate is based upon re-
cent, state-wide experience as the state rate level is determined from the ex-
perience of one or two recent years. But the final basic limits rate is deter-
mined by multiplying the state-wide average rate by two differentials: the
territory's differential as indicated by three or five years' experience, and the
classification differential based upon substantially nation-wide experience.
Since the rate differential for class 1AF (farm automobiles not driven by a
male under 25) is 70 per cent of the 1A rate, the 1AF rate for the District of
Columbia is as easily determined as the 1AF rate for the rural counties of
Iowa.
Products Liability Rates
Products liability rates are worked out jointly by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. However,
for about one quarter of the risks (measured according to the amount of basic
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limits claims) there are no uniform rates, because the hazard in some indus-
tries varies too much from enterprise to enterprise. For the remaining three
quarters of insurance uniform rates have been established according to indus-
tries and, in some cases, kinds of product.
With some exceptions, products liability rates are not calculated on a state-
by-state basis. Most rates are uniform throughout the country. There are two
reasons for this. First, manufacturers are likely to market over a wide area
so that the location of their plants is not a significant risk-changing factor.
Second, though retailers market locally, the credibility of their experience on
a state-by-state basis would be too low to set reliable rates.3 9 This latter factor
is not true of New York State; special rates have been set there for bodily in-
jury in 38 classifications.40 Ninety-eight classifications have nation-wide bodily
injury rates, and all property damage rates are nation wide. Therefore, prod-
ucts liability rate making requires four separate calculations: one for the
property damage rates, nation-wide; one for the 38 special New York State
rates; one for these same 38 classifications for the balance of the nation; and
one for the 98 nation-wide bodily injury rates.
New products liability rates were promulgated in May, 1960. The method
of calculating these rates was different from that used for automobile liability
rates. It was based entirely upon loss ratios. The Bureau attempted to set
each rate so that its experienced loss ratio would be 54 per cent. The calcula-
tion of the 98 nation-wide bodily injury rates, which was typical of the four
different calculations, began with an examination of the experienced loss ratio
for all 98 classifications combined for the years 1955 and 1956, the most recent
39. Credibility criteria in the products liability field are lower than in automobile
liability. Only 683 claims are necessary for complete credibility. Experience of 171 to 245
claims has 50% credibility. Property damage claims for all manually rated classes from
companies reporting to either the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters or the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau (which combined their data in making the rates) included
somewhat less than 5,000 claims a year. Bodily injury claims for those classes with nation-
wide rates were approximately 6,000 claims a year. No figures are available dividing the
claims according to the location of the injury or the residence of the victim, since the
bureaus attribute all claims to the location of the insured. However, there are clearly fewer
claims than would be necessary for significant credibility in many of the fifty-two juris-
dictions (the fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). When individual
classes are considered, the problem is even worse. Of the ninety-five classes with nation-
wide bodily injury rates, only fifteen had bodily injury experience with a credibility of
over 50% when the experience of four years was lumped together. Fifty-three, on the other
hand, had experience with less than 20% credibility. Some of these included an extensive
amount of business. Sugar refining of over six billion pounds a year had only 10% credi-
bility. That means there were between seven and twenty-six claims in a four year period.
In the thirty-eight nation-except-New York classes, the picture was somewhat better.
Eighteen had credibility over 50%, and only 9 had a credibility of 20% or less for the four
years.
40. In addition, there are a few other rates which are set for particular states: bodily
injury for bakeries in Massachusetts, property damage for highway construction in New
York, property damage for gasoline pump lessors in New York, and both property dam-
age and bodily injury for pineapple canners in HawaiL
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years for which experience was available. For those two years, the experi-
enced loss ratio for the 98 classes combined was 51.2 per cent at the old
manual rates. This meant that those rates, as a group, were too high and
should be reduced 5.2 per cent. But a 5.2 per cent reduction of each of the 98
rates would not have been fair, since some of the rates were more out of line
than others. Therefore, the Bureau endeavored first to establish a tentative
schedule of rates which would be equally unfair to all classes. That is, it at-
tempted to establish a tentative schedule of rates in which each rate had a loss
ratio of 51.2 per cent. Then the tentative schedule of rates could be uniformly
reduced by 5.2 per cent to bring the loss ratio for class up to the desired 54
per cent.
In calculating the tentative schedule, four years' experience was used. This
greatly increased the credibility of each class's experience. It also, of course,
involved the use of some older experience, experience too old to be reliable in
setting the final rate. However, it could be assumed that this older experience
would provide a reliable indication of the difference between each specific
class and the norm for all classes, so that the rates' loss ratios could be equal-
ized on the basis of this experience. The plan was to discover the actual loss
ratio for each class for the four years; compare it with the mean loss ratio of
all classes during those same four years; and then establish a tentative rate
for each class which would make each loss ratio equal the mean loss ratio of
all 98 classes. Thus the tentative schedule would be equally unfair to all
classes as they would each have the same loss ratio.
The experienced loss ratios of many of the classes, however, could not be
relied upon because these classes lacked credibility, even when the nation-wide
experience from four years was taken together. The Bureau, then, had to
hypothesize loss ratios for these classes. It did this by calculating a weighted
average between the experienced loss ratio for each noncredible class and the
mean loss ratio for all 98 classes, giving the experienced loss ratio a weight
commensuate with its credibility. That is, the experience of a class with very
little credibility was given very little weight; its actual loss ratio was assumed
to be very close to the mean loss ratio. On the other hand, the experience of a
class with 90 per cent credibility was given great weight; its actual loss ratio
was assumed to be quite close to its experienced loss ratio. Of course classes
with complete credibility were unadjusted, while those with zero credibility
were assigned the mean loss ratio. The important thing to bear in mind is that
these adjustments for credibility caused an adjustment of the loss ratios for
noncredible classes towards the mean loss ratio of all classes.
Now, using these adjusted loss ratios, the Bureau attempted to equalize the
unfairness of the rates. Classes with adjusted loss ratios of 120 per cent of the
mean loss ratio were tentatively given an increase to 120 per cent of their old
rate; classes with adjusted loss ratios of half the mean loss ratio had their
rates tentatively cut in half, etc. The rates in the tentative schedule, therefore,
had equal loss ratios (as adjusted for credibility) and could be considered
equally unfair.
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But this schedule of tentative rates proved to be faulty. In the attempt to
make exact calculations for each rate an error had been made concerning the
whole. The tentative rates were not supposed to change the general rate level.
The old rates were, as a whole, 5.2 per cent too high. The tentative rates were
supposed to retain that error, but make each rate equally unfair-that is, each
5.2 per cent too high. If this had been achieved, the tentative rates would have
yielded the same total premium for the 98 classes combined that the old rates
had. However, the tentative schedule was too high. If it had been promulgated,
the gross receipts from the 98 classes combined would have been increased by'
well over 3 per cent. This error was primarily due to the adjustments for
credibility. The noncredible classes' experienced loss ratios had been adjusted
toward the mean. It so happened that most noncredible classes had experi-
enced loss ratios below the mean, so the adjustment increased more of them
than it decreased. The noncredible classes, as a group, were therefore assumed
to have higher actual loss ratios than they had actually experienced, so that
their tentative rates were, in general, set too high. This error was apparent
only when all the rates were considered together. The lack of credibility pre-
vented any judgment concerning the propriety of most individual rates in the
tentative schedule, so the error could not be corrected by adjusting particular
rates.
To compensate for this error, all the rates in the tentative schedule were
reduced by 3.6 per cent. This brought the rate level of the tentative schedule
down to the actual rate level of the old rates. That is, if this reduced tentative
schedule had been promulgated it would have yielded the same gross premium
for the 98 classes combined as the old rates had. After the 3.6 per cent com-
pensating reduction was made, the new rates were computed by further reduc-
ing each rate by 5.2 per cent, the reduction originally calculated to correct the
fact that the old rate level was too high.41
The anomaly inherent in this method of rate-making can be best under-
stood if we assume that one of the classes with completely credible experience
should have been reduced 5.2 per cent. In other words, its loss ratio by chance
equalled the loss ratio of all classes combined. If its rate were reduced 5.2
41. This description of the method used is somewhat simplified. Actually, the tenta-
tive schedule of rates was not developed by the Bureau, but it was implicit in the cal-
culations, because the Bureau did develop a schedule of factors which, if multiplied by
the old rates, would yield rates with equalized loss ratios. Furthermore, the above descrip-
tion is misleading in indicating that the Bureau explicitly made an across the board reduc-
tion of 3.6% to keep the tentative rates at the old rate level. This, too, was implicit in the
Bureau's calculations, however, because the schedule of factors which the Bureau did
develop had the 3.6% reduction built into it. This was done by calculating a new mean
loss ratio for the table of loss ratios after they had been adjusted for credibility and
developing the factors as ratios between this new mean average and the loss ratio. Since
this new mean average was almost 4% higher than the actual mean for all classes, the
factors included the 3.6% reduction mentioned in the text. These factors were then reduced




per cent, its loss ratio would be exactly the ratio desired. However, the above
method of rate making would cause its rate to be reduced an additional 3.6
per cent. This is because its rate on the tentative schedule would be its old
rate, unchanged by adjustments for credibility (since its experience was com-
pletely credible) or adjustments to the tentative schedule (because it already
had the same loss ratio as all classes combined). But then, in common with
all rates on the tentative schedule, its rate would be reduced first 3.6 per cent
and then 5.2 per cent, so that its rate would be too low to the extent of 3.6
per cent. Furthermore, this would be true of the rates for all classes with
completely credible experience. Each would have a rate 3.6 per cent lower than
its own experience, taken by itself, would dictate.
It should be added that this 3.6 per cent anomaly in the computation of the
98 nation-wide bodily injury rates was the smallest in the four sets of calcula-
tions involved in the recent products liability rate revision. The comparable
adjustment in the property damage rates was 4.4 per cent. For the special
New York bodily injury rates it was 6.5 per cent; and in the calculation of
the rates for those same classes for the balance of the nation it was 11.3 per
cent. This means that the rates for classes with completely credible experi-
ences were off by as much as 11.3 per cent. This, of course, was compensated
by equal errors in the other direction in the rates for classes with less credible
experience. The distribution of those errors, however, cannot be stated with
certainty, since the noncredibility of those classes' experience does not permit
any estimate of what the rates for those classes should have been.
This method of rate making is a modification of the "loss ratio method" of
setting rates. In contrast with the "pure premium method," used in auto-
mobile liability rate making, the loss ratio method is less concerned with
measuring the amount of risk in each classification than it is with being sure
that the ratio of total losses to total premiums will equal the loss ratio built
into the rates. Thus, insurers will neither lose money nor make excessive prof-
its. 42 While this method yields a rate for each class, including those with only
slightly credible experience, each rate is somewhat dependent upon the ex-
perience in the other classes involved in the same calculation. This is clearly
true for the noncredible classes, for their experience is adjusted to conform
somewhat with the experience of all classes. Thus, the sugar refiner's rate is
partially dependent upon the experience in other industries, including tire
manufacturing, breakfast food making, and the packing of nonedible animal
products. But furthermore, unless the noncredible classes' experience is bal-
anced around the mean of all classes, credibility adjustments will put the entire
calculation out of balance; and the method for regaining that balance affects
all rates, credible or not. While attempts are made'to set rates fair to each
class of entrepreneurs involved, fairness often must take a back seat to ade-
quacy of rates. The main emphasis is upon the general rate level, rather than
upon specific rates.
42. See Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property aod Casualty Insurance-Goals,
Technics, and Limits, 15 LAw & CONTmMP. PROB. 493, 500-01 (1950).
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In two respects, product liability rates and automobile liability rates are
comparable. The rounding-off practice has about the same effect in each. The
basic limits rates, which rarely exceed 60 cents, are rounded off to the nearest
cent, except that those under 5 cents are rounded off to the nearest mill. Also,
extended limits rates are calculated in the same way. In fact, the table general-
ly used in products liability is the same as the table generally used in auto-
mobile liability insurance. Some classes, however, have exhibited greater "ex-
cess limits" losses than is usual, and for them there is another, higher table.
THE ERRONEOUS LINK BETWEEN INSURABILITY AND ENTREPRENEURS'
FORESIGHT
In general, then, the actuarial process produces a generalized measure of
risk. The actuary deduces this figure from data concerning a large number of
recent events, which he projects into the future. The risk allocated to a unit
of exposure or to the usual enterprise is merely a fraction of that general risk.
Furthermore, the actuary does not analyze all of the risk-causing factors. To
be sure, some analysis of this kind is implicit in his division of lines of insur-
ance into products liability, automobile liability, etc., and the further sub-
division of those lines. Some further analysis of this kind is also implicit in the
setting of rate territories to distinguish metropolitan risks from rural ones,
etc., and in the division of automobile risks according to the uses of cars and
the ages of the drivers, but this is a gross analysis. A very fine analysis is not
attempted. Similarly, while foresight is an actuarial tool, it is used sparingly.
The actuary's major premise is that the future will be much like the past, that
it will have the same rough mixture of routine and peculiar events.
The Actuarial Reality of the Zone of Risk
Turning to the zone-of-risk theories, it can easily be seen that their concept
of risk has little in common with the quantum of risk discovered by actuarial
techniques.
Consider the guest statute problem. Professor Ehrenzweig states that "It
seems unreasonable to compel the host [whose car is garaged in a guest statute
state], as we do now, to buy insurance against a liability that he might incur
under the law of a [nonguest statute] state possibility to be reached on a yet
unplanned out-of-state trip." 43 But is it really unreasonable to require him to
insure against this out-of-state risk? It should be remembered that his insur-
ance premium was not calculated to cover his personal risk, but was rather
his fraction of the aggregate premium necessary to cover the total risk posed
by automobiles garaged in his rate territory. Whether that premium reflects
guest claims depends upon the frequency of those claims.
Some car owners from that rate territory will undoubtedly drive their cars
into nonguest statute states. They will have accidents in those states. Most of




these accidents will not give rise to guest claims. Some will not involve pas-
sengers; others will involve passengers who are not injured; and still others
will involve injured passengers who cannot recover because they are married
to, or are minor children of, the driver. But some accidents will injure guests
who have standing to make a claim.
If these claims occur only infrequently, they will have practically no effect
upon insurance rates. Actuarial techniques minimize the effect of any single
claim. First, excess limits experience is not considered in deducing basic rates.
A freakish $100,000 claim has no more effect than if it were for only $5,000.
More than one year's experience is often used to set the state-wide rate level,
and territorial rate levels are developed from three or five years' experience;
therefore, infrequent events will not contribute any appreciable bias to the
data when they occasionally occur. Finally, the credibility concept limits the
effect of any particular claim. A single guest claim, then, would have prac-
tically no effect upon insurance rates. If it were against an insured from a
territory with fully credible experience it would represent, at the most, one
out of 1084 claims.44 Even if the average claim in the experience were $700,4 5
making total losses at least $758,800, and the guest claim exceeded basic limits,
so that it was considered to be $5,000, this would represent considerably less
than 1 per cent of the experience; it would, therefore, affect the rate by less
than 1 per cent. In most cases the guest claim would be close to the average,
so that each guest claim would represent about 1/1084th of the experience.
Eleven such claims would represent approximately 1 per cent of the experi-
ence, and would have a 1 per cent effect upon the initial rate calculations.
46
Such miniscule factors are likely to be lost when, in the rate making process,
the actuary rounds off his figures. Class 1A basic limits rates, which are the
basis for all other private passenger rates, are generally under $50. Brooklyn
has the highest in the nation, $119; but in California the highest is $67 for
San Francisco. In Oakland, the next highest, the rate is $47. Rounding off
rates near $50 to the nearest dollar can change the premium by 1 per cent or
more. The average change for such rates would be .5 of one per cent. Most
rates, however, are under $30. In calculating the rate for Wilmington, Dela-
ware, the indicated rate of $15.74 was increased to $16, a change of 1.6 per
44. Full credibility requires at least 1084 claims. See note 32 supra.
45. In fact, the nation-wide average basic limits bodily injury claim for private pas-
senger cars in 1959 was $753.
46. In territories with less experience the effect of one guest claim upon the indicated
rate would be greater, but the weight given to that indicated rate would be less, thus
decreasing its effect. If the experience included 271 claims, it would be 50% credible. As-
suming that the claims averaged $700 eachi, the total losses would be $189,700. An excess
limits guest claim, considered for rate making purposes as a claim of $5,000," would repre-
sent about 2.7% of the experience. Since, however, the experience is given only 50%
credence, it would affect the calculations by half of 2.7% or less than 1.4%. An average
claim would represent 1/271 of the experience, but since the experience had only 50%
credibility, its effect upon the rate calculations would be half of that, or 1/542. It would
take, then, five or six claims to affect the initial calculations by one per cent.
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cent. Had the calculations yielded a figure of $15.51 the rate would have been
increased by over 3 per cent to $16. It will be the exceptional case, therefore,
in which a single, or even a few, guest claims will cause any changes in rates.47
On the other hand, if there are sufficient guest claims to affect the rate,
regardless of the rounding-off practice, then the host should not be able to
complain when his insurance premium reflects those claims. A substantial
number of guest claims would indicate a pattern of travel into nonguest statute
states. The indication would be that the host and his neighbors have taken,
and no doubt will continue to take, a great many out-of-state trips into com-
mon law jurisdictions. From the actuary's standpoint, therefore, these trips
are foreseeable. While the host may have no such trip planned when he buys
his insurance, it is foreseeable that he will plan such a trip in the future. Of
course, he may be atypical and stay home. If so, he is unlike his neighbors
who have been lumped together with him in the rating territory. He might
then have grounds for complaint-but they are wholly personal grounds which
cannot be recognized if the insurance industry is to function. He cannot pre-
tend to speak for his neighbors in complaining that insurance rates reflect
guest claims. As far as his neighborhood is concerned those claims are "fore-
seeable and insurable."
The zone-of-risk analysis of the frolic and detour problem suffers from the
same difficulty. Dean Smith hypothesized a business near Wall Street in Man-
hattan with customers in the Times Square area and a truck for making
deliveries to them. Though the entrepreneur orders his truck driver to stay
on Broadway and to avoid personal errands, he can foresee that the truck will
occasionally return south by way of Seventh Avenue for reasons personal to
the driver. He can even foresee that the driver may deviate as far north as
Columbus Circle. He cannot foresee a trip to the Bronx or to Staten Island,
so the zone-of-risk does not include upper Manhattan, the Bronx, or Staten
Island. The entrepreneur, then, should not be liable for accidents in those
places.
But, again, the entrepreneur's personal estimate of his zone of risk is irrele-
vant. The rate territory for commercial vehicles in lower Manhattan includes
all of Manhattan, plus the Bronx and Brooklyn. In other words, the Wall
Street entrepreneur pays his share of the total risk incurred by trucks garaged
in those three boroughs. Even Manhattan enterprises which qualify for e-x-
47. Of course, a few guest claims can still affect an occasional rate. They can be,
like the proverbial straw which broke the camel's back, the cause for rounding up instead
of down in the rare case where the indicated rate is very close to the $.50 mark. Assume,
for instance, that the guest claim represents approximately one-tenth of one per cent of the
experience, and that the indicated rate is $50.53. Without this claim the indicated rate
would be $50.48. The claim would be the difference between rounding the rate up to $51
and rounding it down to $50. The chances of this happening, assuming that the claim
represented one-tenth of one per cent of the experience and the rate was close to $50,
would be about one in twenty. The host's complaint would not be too telling, for he would
have to urge that he was overcharged $.52 and that he had a right to be undercharged
$.48.
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perience-rating pay part of that risk, unless they are so large that their ex-
perience is completely credible. Assume that each entrepreneur within the rat-
ing territory has formulated an idea of his enterprise's zone of risk. Occasion-
ally a truck will stray beyond its zone and have an accident. Will this happen
so infrequently that liability in such cases will not affect insurance rates? If
so, the zone-of-risk concept is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, it happens
frequently enough to affect insurance rates this extra-zone risk is insurable.
Each entrepreneur will be surprised when he sees the report of an extra-zone
accident, for, by definition, it happened beyond the zone of his expectation.
But the actuary, if he were informed about the circumstances of all accidents
in the experience he was studying, would not be surprised. He would know
that accidents occurred with some regularity beyond the zone of normal busi-
ness activity.48 Of course, an occasional accident would surprise even him. He
might be blas6 about a Wall Street-based truck piling up in Yonkers, but he
would be somewhat surprised if the accident occurred in Albany. Yet, the same
factors which made the accident surprising would make it ineffective in the
rate making process. It would represent a miniscule part of the experience.
In short, an entrepreneur's a priori concept of his own zone of risk should
not be a determining factor in the frolic and detour problem; this is so be-
cause his vehicle and those of his fellow entrepreneurs in the same rating terri-
tory are probably involved in accidents just beyond the boundaries of their
respective a priori zones with sufficient frequency to make those accidents
"foreseeable and insurable" from an actuarial standpoint. This concept requires
a sophisticated approach to each enterprise's zone of risk-an understanding
that each zone includes these accidents. However, even this sophisticated no-
tion of the zone of risk may not be significant, for the number of accidents
occurring beyond this extended zone will be so small in relation to the total
number of claims against the enterprises grouped in the rating territory that
these extra-zone claims, if honored, will have no appreciable effect upon insur-
ance rates. Their effect will probably be obscured by the practice of rounding
off the rates, so no entrepreneur could claim his insurance rate was unfairly
increased by the payment of such claims. 4
9
48. Though the analysis used here is the same as that used in discussing the guest
statute the problem is complicated by the fact that instead of a simple geographical bound-
ary (a state line), there is a complex boundary which is crossed whenever a truck leaves
its particular zone of risk, even though it stays within the rating territory. The "zone"
here is not merely the territory of Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn. It is the aggre-
gate of each zone hypothesized for each entrepreneur. Thus, while a truck from the Wall
Street-based business which strays into Brooklyn is still within the rating territory, and
is within many other entrepreneurs' zones as well, it is beyond the zone of the risk, even
from the actuary's standpoint, because it has left the zone of its enterprise.
49. This is true even if the entrepreneur qualifies for experience rating and the out-
landish claim was against him. This would clearly be true if his rate were set entirely upon
his own experience, that is, if his experience had 100% credibility. Then the analysis in
the text would apply with very little change, except that the entrepreneur himself would
soon have a sophisticated idea of his zone of risk. After a couple of years he would realize
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The same point could be made concerning the other uses to which the zone-
of-risk analysis has been put. The risk of a producer's liability under foreign
strict-liability products-liability law, as well as the risk of an automobile
owner's liability under foreign owners' liability statutes, is either frequent
enough to be "foreseen and insured," or is infrequent enough to have only a
small, random effect upon rates. Either the risk is "foreseeable and insurable,"
or it is de minimus.
Another difficulty with the zone-of-risk analysis, particularly as it is applied
to conflicts problems, is that it assumes that there is a measurable difference
between risks in various jurisdictions. In the automobile field this assumption
is valid. Rates differ from state to state, though how much of this difference
reflects differing law is unknown.50 Many other factors, such as congestion,
highway design, and regional habits may be more important. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether foreign law, though different, really imposes a dif-
ferent quantum of risk.51
But in the case of product liability there are no state-by-state rates except
for the 38 special bodily injury rates in New York.52 Even if actuarial tech-
niques were mechanically applied to the experience in Ohio, for example,
there would be no reason to believe that the rates thus deducted would accu-
rately represent the risk of Ohio law. After all, the nation-wide rates are
demonstrably inaccurate for the classes with completely credible experience,
and it is known that these inaccuracies are balanced by undeterminable errors
in the other direction in the rates for classes with noncredible experience. Any
attempt to calculate rates for any one state alone, of course, would have to be
based upon experience with much less credibility, so that errors would be much
more likely. In addition, if the experience of many classes were combined, so
that at least the general rate level could be set according to credible experi-
ence, that rate level would still not reflect the peculiar risk of Ohio law. It
would necessarily include losses in Ohio's tire industry, which are governed
by the laws of many states in which the tire industry distributes, as well as the
losses of Ohio's bakeries, which are rarely sued out of state. Furthermore, it
would include food industries, which are subject to the Ohio strict liability
that "the damnedest things happen in this business." The few claims which were so far-
flung as to still shock him would represent such a small part of his experience that they
would not materially change his rate. If, however, the enterprise had experience of less
credibility, the entrepreneur might still retain a relatively naive concept of the zone of
foreseeable risk. He might still be surprised at accidents which, taking the rating territory
as a whole, did not involve unforeseeable deviations. However, since the credibility as-
signed to the enterprise's experience would be low, the effect that experience would have
upon the rate charged would be small, and hence the effect of a frolic claim would be
similarly decreased.
50. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insrance, 58 MIcrH. L.
Rtv. 689, 723 (1960).
51. For instance, Professor Peck concludes that substituting comparative negligence
for the common law defense of contributory negligence does not measurably increase
automobile liability insurance rates. Peck, supra note 50.
52. Plus the few special rates mentioned in note 40 supra.
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rule, as well as nonfood industries, which are subject only to negligence and
warranty law. Thus, it would not be possible to set accurate Ohio rates. No
attempt has been made to do so. The rates charged to Ohio entrepreneurs and
to most non-Ohio entrepreneurs, therefore, reflect an inaccurate apportion-
ment of the nation-wide product liability risk.
Can, then, a non-Ohio entrepreneur claim immunity from Ohio's strict lia-
bility rule because he has not insured against a fortuitous application of Ohio
law? Unless he is subject to a special state rate, such as the 38 bodily injury
rates in New York, his claim is clearly invalid. He has paid for part of the
Ohio risk, even though he is from a state with a different law.53
There is yet another difficulty with the zone-of-risk approach. It assumes
that extra-zone activities are more hazardous. It may well be, for instance,
that highway conditions, amount of congestion, etc., make accidents less likely
in a neighboring nonguest statute state than in the host's guest statute juris-
diction. The added safety might offset the added risk of guest claims. Similar-
ly, a Manhattan truck driver who frolics to Staten Island, a trip which in-
volves an extended ferry ride and leads to less congested roads, may be less
likely to have an accident than his fellow employee who takes the same amount
of time for five personal errands within the zone of risk in lower Manhattan.
In these cases it would not seem that the entrepreneur could claim that he had
not undertaken to sustain the quantum of risk involved. He had provided for
a greater risk than that which caused the loss.
The Actuarial Importance of These Rules of Law
Finally, even if the zone-of-risk analysis had validity, there is reason to be-
lieve it is not relevant to the particular rules of liability to which it has been
applied, because they are not important in the process of risk administration.
Current insurance practice makes it likely that the driver of an automobile
or truck is himself covered by the owner's insurance under the "omnibus
clause." A judgment against the driver, then, is payable from the same fund-
the owner's insurance-as if it were against the owner.54 The omnibus clause
53. Even if products liability rates were written upon a state by state basis, there
would be some question as to whether the Ohio strict liability rule in food cases creates
a unique risk. Twenty-one other jurisdictions have substantially the same law. Only six-
teen, at most, have rejected it. The remaining fourteen American jurisdictions are, for
the moment, uncommitted. Prosser, supra note 25, at 1107-11.
54. How would the zone-of-risk analysis apply to cases in which the insured owner
lent his vehicle to another entrepreneur with a different zone-of-risk, and the bailee was
covered by the omnibus clause in the owner's policy? Clearly, an accident within the
bailee's zone of risk, but beyond the owner's zone of risk, should be within the omnibus
coverage. In conflicts cases the combinations of difficulties are legion. A guest-statute state
owner lends his car to a common-law state bailee who, with permission, takes a neighbor
from the common-law state for a ride and injures him in a third, guest-statute state. A
similar problem can also arise in the products liability field, since some manufacturers'
policies include a "dealers clause," whereby wholesalers and retailers are also insured.
See Gowan, Products Liability Insurance, 26 IxsumA.cz CouNsEL T. 411 (1959),
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
purports to cover anyone using the vehicle with the owner's permission. Per-
missive use is a vague concept, but it certainly covers the usual car rental case
as well as the usual employee case. In some jurisdictions it will cover the
employee even though he has deviated quite far from his assigned task. Quite
clearly, the omnibus clause reduces the importance of owners' liability statutes.
In some jurisdictions it may make the distinction between frolic and detour
largely irrelevant.5
But even in those cases where the omnibus clause is not a factor, either be-
cause the owner is self-insured or because the jurisdiction construes the clause
to exclude frolics, the vagarities of agency law probably have little important
effect in master-servant cases. It is likely that juries pay little attention to
such legal technicalities. They will rarely find that there was a frolic. Only in
those cases which courts withhold from juries, and in a few others where
juries find a frolic, will the limits of the scope of employment determine the
issue. It is likely, then, that there is little difference between the actuarial
burden of the owner's liability statutes, the omnibus clause burden in the more
liberal states, and common law vicarious liability.
The same is probably true of the Ohio products liability rule making sellers
of defective food liable without a showing of negligence.
[A]n honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in
a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where neg-
ligence does not. When a negligence action is brought against a manufac-
turer, the plaintiff is faced with two initial tasks. One is to prove that his
injury has been caused by a defect in the product. The other is to prove
that the defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant.
For neither of these is strict liability of any aid to him whatever .... Once
over these two hurdles, the plaintiff has a third task, to prove that the
defect was there because of the defendant's negligence. This is by far the
easiest of the three, and it is one which the plaintiff almost never failsY0
The Ohio rule, therefore, would probably have little effect upon product lia-
bility insurance rates even if an Ohio rate could be calculated with any degree
of accuracy.
55. Most courts define permission to be consent to use at the time or place of the
accident for an authorized purpose.... Permission to use for one purpose does not
imply permission to use for all purposes, but a reasonable deviation from route may
be impliedly permitted .... If a car is borrowed for purely social purposes, a gen-
eral permission may be implied in fact to cover an extended use ....
The minority merely requires permission in the first instance .... Any use
thereafter is permissive even if the car is driven to a place or used for a purpose
not contemplated by the owner ....
If a master-servant relation exists . . . permission is coextensive with 'scope
of employment' in the majority jurisdictions . . . [In the minority jurisdictions,]
no attempt is made to limit liability to the scope of the employment.
Automobile Liability Insurance-Permissive Use Under The Omnibus Clause, 28 TEXAS
L. REv. 719-20 (1950).
56. Prosser, supra note 25, at 1114.
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The importance of these rules from a quantum of risk standpoint is further
minimized when the settlement process is considered. After all, few claims are
taken to court; most are settled. Defendants will not be anxious to litigate if
their only defense hinges upon the shadowy concept of "frolic and detour."
Certainly the defendant in a poison food case will seek to avoid trial if his only
defense is a claim that the defect was caused by an unavoidable accident.
These defenses, then, will rarely be principal issues in contested cases. The
defendant who can only rely upon such weak points will be anxious to settle.57
It can be assumed, therefore, that the main effect of these rules of law is to
reduce the amount paid in settlement, rather than to reduce the number of
claims paid. While they might cause some hundred thousand dollar claims to
be settled for fifty thousand, and some five thousand dollar claims to be settled
for four thousand, it is probable that one hundred dollar claims will not suffer
much reduction because of these rules of law. Even if these doctrines were
applicable to enough cases to affect the rates, their effect upon basic limits
rates might be nil, because so much of the basic limits experience involves
small claims which are not the subject of spirited bargaining at settlement.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that rules of law peculiar to some jurisdic-
tions have any effect upon excess limits rates because these rates are based
upon differentials which are uniform for most states, including those states
which do not honor such rules. The percentage of excess limits experience
affected by these rules, then, is likely to be smallYa8
We must conclude, therefore, that these zone-of-risk theories of enterprise
liability overlook the actuarial realities of the administration of risk. They rely
upon an entrepreneur's hypothetical estimate of the risk in the light of his
foresight, rather than upon the actuary's estimate of the risk based upon hind-
sight. Furthermore, they assume that certain factors increase the quantum of
risk, which may be contrary to fact or, at least, not measurably true.
THE LOGICAL VALIDITY OF THE ZoNE-oF-RISK APPROACH
There is also a logical fallacy in the zone-of-risk approach. This theory
would have the law decide which losses should be charged to the entrepreneur
by discovering what losses he has provided for. But the entrepreneur provides
for the losses the law dictates he must bear. The theory, then, is tautological.
The rules of liability are to be dictated by insurance practices which are, in
57. See Peck, supra note 50, at 727, concerning the insurance adjustment practices
which reflect the fact that contributory negligence, though doctrinally a defense, cannot
be relied upon at trial.
58. Of course, unique rules of law could result in a special excess limits table for the
state that has them. Whether this will happen depends upon the importance of the rule.
If the rule enhances the awards in all cases, it may affect the rates. If it only applies to a
few cases, it must greatly enhance the awards in those cases or its effect will be undetect-
able. Finally, if its effect is apparent only in large cases, it will be undetectable because of
the low credibility of experience involving large claims.
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turn, dictated by the rules of liability.59 All that can be concluded from such
a premise is that whatever is, should be.
Specific recommendations which claim to be deduced by this method, then,
turn out not to be based upon it at all. For instance, Professor Ehrenzweig is
quite clear that the entrepreneur should never be permitted to defend against
the application of the law of his domicile or place of business. This law, to say
the least, is "foreseeable and insurable." But the entrepreneur theory does not
necessarily lead us to this conclusion.
Let us assume, for instance, that there are specific product-liability rates
for meat packers in Ohio and Kentucky and that, because Ohio imposes strict
liability while Kentucky does not, the rate for Ohio risks are higher than those
of Kentucky risks.60 Let us assume further that two packers each attempt to
serve the Cincinnati-Louisville area. Each sells 60 per cent of its product in
Cincinnati and 40 per cent of its product in Louisville. The only difference
between these two enterprises is that one's plant is located in Louisville, the
other's in Cincinnati. It is quite clear that the Louisville packer has significant
contact with Ohio. Sixty per cent of his product is sold there. If he sells
tainted meat, sixty per cent of his victims can be expected to be in Ohio. He
should, therefore, provide for the harsher burden of Ohio law, as Professor
Ehrenzweig points out. However, Professor Ehrenzweig would hold the com-
peting Cincinnati packer to Ohio law for 100 per cent of his product, even
though 40 per cent was sold in Louisville and therefore 40 per cent of his
victims would be in Kentucky. This appears to be an arbitrary position, since,
except for the location of their plants, the two enterprises are exactly the
same. Why can't the Cincinnati packer demand his share of the lesser burden
of Kentucky law? The products-liability question must be distinguished from
certain others which are clearly dependent upon the location of the entrepre-
neur's plant. For instance, Kentucky's policy toward employees is paramount
for the Louisville packer and irrelevant to the packer in Cincinnati. The Cin-
cinnati enterprise, which creates employment in Ohio, cannot claim that its
unemployment compensation burden should be partially governed by the law
of Kentucky. The location of his plant in Ohio is determinative. However,
products liability governs legal relationships between buyers and sellers in the
59. "In other words, it is not true that a risk shifting device can be used only in case
of liability for negligent 'detours.' It has such flexibility that it can be used whenever a
court decrees liability. That is to say, its limits are set by rules determining liability, and
courts by their decrees and judgments make those rules." Douglas, supra note 4, at 591.
60. This assumption is not only false because products liability rates are written
country wide, but because, even if they were not, insurance practice considers only the
location of the insured enterprise, not the situs of the injury. Thus, if an automobile garaged
in New Jersey has an accident in California, a claim against the driver of the New Jersey
car will be part of the New Jersey experience, not part of the California experience. It
is, after all, indicative of the kind of claim which insurance companies doing business in
New Jersey must pay. In the textual hypothetical it is assumed that claims arising in each




market. Why is the extent of the market not regarded as determinative, and
the location of the plant considered fortuitous ?61
The reason Professor Ehrenzweig did not take this position was that he was
not reasoning from an economic premise. He knew that if the law was other-
wise, entrepreneurs could adjust to it. He knew that most Kentucky claim-
ants would come to Ohio to sue the Cincinnati packer. He knew, moreover,
that Ohio courts could consider that that packer had a meaningful contact
with Ohio and that Ohio law should govern in such cases. The packer and his
insurer, aware of Ohio law, could foresee this added burden, not only as to
Ohio sales but as to Kentucky sales as well.
But, given enough advance notice, the entrepreneur can adjust to a great
number of additional costs. Should the concept of "frolic" be abandoned? To
some extent it has been in states which have enacted owners' liability laws;
and owners have adjusted to it by insurance. Should an entrepreneur's liability
for injuries to persons upon his premises be extended to include strict liability
for all injuries to persons on the sidewalks abutting his premises? He could
insure against such liability also, if given advance notice. In short, all that the
risk spreading branch of the entrepreneur theory points out is that, within
limits, enterprises may insure any risk if given sufficient notice. Extensive
risks will have actuarial credibility which, after a time, will permit their
evaluation so that the cost of such risks can be assessed. Risks without credi-
bility will probably be slight enough so that no injustice will result from the
fact that they cannot be assessed; provided, of course, that they are similar
enough to determinable risks to be within the coverage of standard insurance
policies.
This does not mean that the risk spreading branch of the entrepreneur
theory is worthless. This simply means that its place in the theory of enterprise
liability is limited. It is a functional statement, rather than the sole justifica-
tion of enterprise liability.
Risx SPREADING AND THE RATIONALE OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Dean Smith stated that the function of enterprise liability is "[T]o include
in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying
61. A similar argument could be made concerning a Hartford car rental agency whose
U-Drive-It cars invaded Massachusetts with some regularity. If we assume that the
Connecticut burden is more onerous than the Massachusetts burden, the question arises
as to why the Hartford agency cannot claim the benefit of that lesser burden for the
mileage its cars travel in Massachusetts. It is, after all, selling a certain number of miles
of Massachusetts travel each year, and it should only have to underwrite the cost of those
miles as determined by the law of Massachusetts. Professor Ehrenzweig does not agree.
[Connecticut] law was . . .the law properly applicable to any accident caused by
one of the agency's cars kept, rented, and insured in Connecticut; and any more
lenient laws prevailing elsewhere could not benefit the defendant. Wherever injured
or resident, the plaintiff in the Connecticut court can rely on the lex fori which will
not admit of any exceptions.
Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALm L.J. 978, 986 (1960).
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on an enterprise." His idea was seconded by many, including Talbot Smith,
who observed that "business must pay its passage." But what losses are prop-
erly considered "incident to carrying on an enterprise"? What costs are part
of a business' "passage"?
The language used implies an analogy to other business expenses. As busi-
nesses must pay for capital, material, and labor, so must they pay for the lives,
bodies, and property they inadvertently consume. This analogy to economic
principles, however, conceals value judgments, similar to those involved in
other branches of the law, which dictate the extent to which businesses should
pay for the capital, material, and labor intentionally devoted to an enterprise.
Technology requires the barest union of labor and materials. While capital
goods are necessary, "capital" is not. All that is required is some technique
to feed and maintain the labor force which creates capital goods, given the fact
that the product of that labor will not be immediately useful for consumption.
Labor, furthermore, need only be paid enough to continue working. These are
the technological minima; and they are completely unsatisfactory on nontech-
nological grounds. Hence, we embrace a market economy, including capitalistic
methods of obtaining capital goods, instead of forced labor or collective eco-
nomic organization. But the economic forces of even this market economy lead
to undesirable results, and for humanitarian reasons (though not without some
economic justification) we have mitigated the rigors of a free market economy
with minimum wage laws, wages and hours laws, child labor laws, etc. And it
is upon these same nontechnological and humanitarian grounds that we ap-
prove of enterprise liability. In other words, those losses which enterprise lia-
bility seeks to repair are not losses which need be repaired to assure the main-
tenance of production. Moreover, though these losses have some economic
effect, since their immediate victims are removed from the ranks of consumers,
their repair is no more important to the operation of a market economy than
is the repair of losses from natural causes.62 These repairs are made, then, for
humanitarian and moral reasons rather than for technological or economic
ones.
The entrepreneur theory also attempts to gain credence by invoking the con-
cept of commutative justice. Though the entrepreneur himself is relatively
blameless, his enterprise entails a certain amount of risk, and it is proper to
place the burden of this risk upon him in the first instance, because he can pass
it on to his customers. They benefit from the risky endeavor and should there-
fore suffer the burden of the more or less inevitable accidents which arise from
that activity. 3 This view suffers from two difficulties. It assumes that the in-
62. Douglas quotes Dean Smith's observation that employers should not be liable for
their employees' acts which are unconnected with the enterprise "because it would result
in including in the cost of production an item which economically does not belong there,"
text accompanying note 15 supra and observes that this is no answer. "It depends on the
definition of 'economically." Douglas, supra note 4, at 593 n.24.
63. Professor Ehrenzweig appears to have adopted this view when he quotes Justice
Traynor with approval to the effect that products liability is justified because "the risk
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juries are somehow attributable to the enterprise activity; and it involves eco-
nomic assumptions of doubtful validity.
Turning first to the economic assumptions, it is probable that customers will
not suffer the entire burden of enterprise liability. Prices, after all, are deter-
mined by the interaction of supply and demand. If demand remains stable,
an industry cannot raise its prices without also decreasing its sales. The extent
of this decrease depends upon the slope of the demand curve. If it is relatively
steep, changes in price will be accompanied by relatively small changes in
volume. If the curve is relatively flat, a slight rise in price will cause a large
loss of volume. Depending upon the industry's demand curve, then, the burden
of enterprise liability will be allocated between the industry and its customers,
the former suffering some decrease in volume, the latter some increase in
price."4 Insofar as there is a decrease in volume, the burden is suffered by the
entrepreneurs, laborers, investors, and suppliers involved.
The distribution of the industry's part of the burden among its constituent
groups depends upon a myriad of factors. Highly competitive industries can
only decrease production by driving their weakest enterprises out of business.
Until this is accomplished, no price rise will be possible and the profits of all
enterprises will be less. Whether this will happen, and when it will happen,
will depend in turn upon the ease with which plants can be converted to other
kinds of production and upon whether the weak enterprises are financed in
the main by stock or debt. When these enterprises finally do leave the indus-
try, the remaining businesses may return to normal, but the companies which
have failed, together with their employees, suppliers, and investors, will suffer
the main effect of the burden. If, on the other hand, the industry can intention-
ally curtail production, all enterprises will suffer a reduction in profits. The
amount of this reduction will depend upon the amount of fixed costs which
must be spread over a smaller volume of business, the ability of labor to resist
attempted cuts in payroll, and similar factors. Other factors are also relevant:
the condition of the money market, the ability of suppliers to find alternative
markets, etc.
It must also be observed that the customers' side of this problem is equally
complex. If the industry's customers are also business enterprises, that part
of the burden passed on to them in the form of higher prices must be distrib-
uted among their owners, creditors, employees, customers and suppliers in
the same manner as the original entrepreneurs spread the initial burden.
In short, the ultimate distribution of the enterprise liability burden cannot
be the subject of easy generalizations. Assuming for the moment that the bur-
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944), quoted in Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE
L.J. 794, 798 (1960). This appears to be the position of Dean Smith, Larson, and Harper
and James, note 9 supra. But as to Harper and James, see note 66 infra.
64. See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TEwx. L. IEv. 938, 947 (1957).
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den is significant, so that entrepreneurs react to it rather than suffer it un-
noticed,6 5 all that can be said is that entrepreneurs probably bear part of it
themselves, that they spread part of it to their employees, creditors, suppliers,
and customers, and that the members of each of these groups spread it, in
turn, to those with whom they have important economic relations.
It might be thought that this does not mean that the commutative justice
argument is wrong but, on the contrary, shows how right it really is. Cus-
tomers are not the only beneficiaries of enterprise. Laborers, suppliers, in-
vestors, and owners also benefit. If they did not also suffer part of the burden
of industry-induced accidents, there would be no commutative justice. The
fact that they too bear part of the burden indicates that there is commutative
justice.66 On close examination, however, this argument appears faulty. The
amount of benefit a one company town derives from that company when its
plant is producing at capacity does not vary with the shape of the supply and
demand curves which govern the company's market. Yet the shape of those
curves does, in part, determine the impact of enterprise liability costs on the
amount of production at the plant. Similarly, two competing entrepreneurs
may each be equal beneficiaries of their respective enterprises, though the
labor force in one enterprise is organized and the other is not. The union's
ability to resist cutbacks in payroll costs (through contract provisions for a
guaranteed minimum wage, severance pay, call-in pay, featherbedding, etc.)
may make the organized entrepreneur suffer more from a loss of volume than
his unorganized competitor. The commutative argument, therefore, relies upon
very rough justice indeed.
Of course, this roughness in principle may not be mirrored by a roughness
in fact. The cost of enterprise liability may be small enough so that it has only
minor economic consequences and there is, therefore, little need for fine, exact
adjustments. But this is practically a return to Baty's deep pocket argument.
In place of the entrepreneur's deep pocket we have substituted the pocket of
65. Though economists generally assume that the market is responsive to all stimuli,
one can wonder whether or not this is true. It seems likely that some items are so small
that they do not affect the price mechanism. Products liability rates, for instance, are
quite small in some industries, even in those industries with substantial claims experience.
The non-New York rate for restaurants at maximum limits is $.4592 per $1,000 of sales.
A canner of meat or seafood pays $.4624 per $1,000 of sales. These rates, which are less
than .05 of one per cent of the market price, may be too small to have an effect upon
prices. If the canner's rate does affect prices to the wholesaler, he will be unable to pass
all of that burden to the grocer. That amount which he may theoretically be able to pass
to the grocer may be too small, in fact, to actually pass on.
The above rates are stated to the hundredth of a cent, even though basic limits rates
are rounded off to the nearest cent, because the excess limits factors have two decimal
places. Some companies round off their final rates, others do not.
66. Harper and James appear to be of this opinion. They state that the entrepreneur
passes the burden on to the "beneficiaries" of the enterprise. They are explicit on the point
that this includes employees as well as customers. They do hot specify any other class,




every man. His pocket may not be deep in absolute terms, but it is in relation
to the amount taken from it. Commutative justice dictates that some amount
be taken and some is. The proper amount is so small that it is really not un-
just if twice as much is taken. But, if taking twice as much will not cause
unjust impoverishment, by the same token there would be no unjust enrich-
ment if nothing were taken. It follows that there is no strong economic basis
for the commutative justice argument.
The Allocation of Losses Among Various Enterprises
Finally, many justifications for the entrepreneur theory, including the com-
mutative justice argument, are based upon the assumption that the enterprise
has, in some sense, caused the loss in question. This is not thought of as direct,
physical causation (except in the unusual case), but is thought of as a matter
of risk making. However, this is a difficult concept to nail down, for few acci-
dents occur in the context of a single institution. The entrepreneur's work-
man is also a household's breadwinner. The victim of a meat-packer's mistake
was poisoned in his employer's lunch room, at a restaurant where he was a
patron, or in his own home where he consumed the stock of the household
larder. A change in the practices of these other institutions might have avoided
the injury. Insofar as the injuries could not be avoided, these other institu-
tions might be charged with the loss-shifting and loss-spreading function.
The law comes close to recognizing this fact explicitly in the borrowed ser-
vant cases, and in those workmen's compensation cases where the employee is
injured in the course of his employment by an outsider. In those cases the
employer is liable, but the outsider is also subject to a "third party" action. 67
But this double institution problem also occurs in losses involving only one
business, the other "enterprise" being the injured person's household. The
trichinosis cases are an obvious example. Trichinae-free pork can be assured
either through proper feeding methods or by prolonged freezing of fresh pork.
Sufficient cooking will make contaminated pork wholesome. Most of the cases
have considered the disease to be "incident" to the kitchen, rather than to
business practice. 8
This line of reasoning can be taken even further, as it was when Chief Jus-
tice Shaw apologized for the abominable fellow-servant rule in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester R.R. 60 Farwell had lost his hand due to the negligence
67. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ch. XIV (1952). Of course, this is an
incomplete recognition of the point, because the employer or his insurer is subrogated to
the employee's rights in the third party action, and is enabled thereby to recoup his pay-
ment of compensation benefits. Similarly, in the borrowed servant cases the law attempts
to choose between the two enterprises involved, rather than seek contribution from both.
68. DIcIERsoN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 190-211 (1951);
Eisenback v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939) (restaurant liable
to patron on breach of warranty, but restaurant's suit over against its supplier dismissed
because "a party cannot recover for a loss that he could have averted by the exercise of
due care"). Contra, McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E2d 513 (1936).
69. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
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of another workman. Institutionally, he represented the overlap of two enter-
prises. On the one hand, he was laboring to be a good provider for his house-
hold. On the other hand, he was working for the railroad to help it in its task
as a common carrier for the benefit for shippers and consignees in Massachu-
setts. Justice Shaw did not think of the case in these exact terms, but his
opinion reflects the multi-institutional aspect of the case. "These are perils,"
he observed, "which ... are perils incident to the service, and which can be
as distinctly foreseen and provided for in the rate of compensation as any
others. To say that the master shall be responsible because the damage is
caused by his agents, is assuming the very point which remains to be proved."7 0
Having thus questioned the relevancy of the railroad-institutional context of
the accident, Chief Justice Shaw could find no justification for allocating the
loss to the company. He apparently viewed the plaintiff in his household-in-
stitutional context, where he occupied the status of breadwinner: "[I]t is the
ordinary case of one sustaining an injury in the course of his own employment
[as a breadwinner?], in which he must bear the loss himself, or seek his
remedy, if he have any, against the actual wrong-doer." 71 Plaintiff's injury,
a crushed hand, was typical of life in general. Plaintiff's wife could have
suffered it in the clothes wringer. He or his children could have been so in-
jured by the family horse. Chief Justice Shaw was content to leave the burden
of the loss upon the household, the institution which traditionally cares for
the sick, the infant, and the infirm. The injury, he stated was "the result of a
pure accident, like those which all men, in all employments, and at all times,
are more or less exposed; and like similar losses from accidental causes, it
must rest where it first fell, unless the plaintiff has a remedy against the per-
son actually in default . . . .
Now that insurance is readily available and the household can be thought
of as an enterprise, as it is in connection with automobile risks, we can make
a better case for Chief Justice Shaw's position. Plaintiff's injury was incident
to his position as a breadwinner for his household. It was typical of the risks
of that position. Furthermore, it was not atypical of other household risks.
Nonbreadwinners suffer similar injuries. The household, being the primary
institution for care, has the primary responsibility for this burden. It can
spread the loss among its members. If it is oppulent or has a number of bread-
winners, it is in some sense self-insured. If not, it can insure.
Contrast current thinking concerning workmen's compensation. Even horse-
play accidents are compensable, as indeed they should be. The entrepreneur
theory has been thought by one author to justify this result. He said:
Clearly, fooling at work is incidental to it, and a hazard of men working
together. The more recent and better rule is to allow an award for an in-
jury resulting from horseplay, even to aggressors, where the injury is a
70. Id. at 57.




by-product of associating men in close contacts, thus realistically recog-
nizing the "strains and fatigue from human and mechanical impacts." 73
The same reasoning might apply to automobile injuries on the Labor Day
weekend, when employers give most employees three days to escape further
the "strains and fatigue" of their employment. Highway congestion, accom-
panied by foreseeable carnage, is induced by this business practice. Yet could
one argue that the injuries should be compensable under workmen's compen-
sation? It may be answered that such injuries are handled by other means, by
making each car owner an entrepreneur who must insure. But that is the very
question to be decided. It can be decided either way. It is, perhaps, some an-
swer to say that the practice of insurance does lessen the social problem. But
automobile liability insurance will not compensate all victims of automobile
accidents. Negligent drivers and members of their immediate families cannot
recover. Blameless victims who are injured by uninsured motorists cannot
recover. These groups must look to their own medical and accident insurance,
which is less common than liability insurance, for recovery. Yet it is doubtful
that society is ready to extend workmen's compensation coverage to include
all automobile injuries on national holidays. These losses have been allocated
to the household enterprise, which must bear that burden until such time as it
is encompassed by more inclusive welfare legislation.
Chief Justice Shaw, in allocating the risk of industrial accidents to the house-
hold, wrongly assumed that the employee had been compensated for the risk
by the wage rate. Actually, the contract of employment reflects the bargain-
ing power of the parties, and a greater risk will not increase the employee's
bargaining power unless it is so great that it frightens away the mass of ap-
plicants, causing a labor shortage for the job in question. But since Shaw's
opinion, the development of organized labor has made compensation for in-
dustrial accidents a bargainable issue. Indeed, many unions have won conces-
sions on this point.74 Yet few would hold that because employee welfare has
become a bargainable issue, Shaw's position should now be adopted. Work-
men's compensation has allocated some of the burden of industrial accidents
to business enterprise, which must bear that burden until, again, such time as
this risk is encompassed by more inclusive government welfare schemes.
It might be objected that the above is all based upon carefully chosen ex-
amples. The industrial accident involves one who is performing the bread-
73. Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising Out of" Employment, 3 NAACA L.J.
15, 57-58 (1949), quoting Harford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App. D.C. 52, 58, 112
F.2d 11, 17 (1940) (Rutledge, J.).
74. Most notable is the United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, financed
by a royalty upon each ton of coal mined in the organized soft-coal industry. In the first
nine years of operation it had a total income of $882,423,780. It payed almost $330,000,000
for pensions, over $246,000,000 for hospital and medical care, over $105,000,000 for cash
aid to disabled miners, and almost $76,000,000 for aid to widows and survivors of miners.
36 L.R.R.M. 187-88 (1955). See also 46 L.R.R.M. 319 (1960). For a recent study of
health plans, see GARBARiNO, HEALTHa PLANS AND COLLECrIVE BARGAINING (1960).
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winning chore for the household while working for his employer. The third
party action involves an employee performing a chore for his employer when
injured by another. The trichinosis cases involve one who is the beneficiary
of the household kitchen, a central household function, when he is injured by
pork which was sold in a contaminated condition. A great number of accidents
occur in cases which do not lie so near the intersection of two institutional
patterns. For instance, if a taxicab jumps a curb and injures a child playing
on the sidewalk, the child's household duties did not play an important role
in causing the accident. But even in this case the accident would have been
avoided if the child had not been permitted to play near the street. The causa-
tion argument, after all, relies upon the concept of risk, rather than the con-
cept of physical causation. The question then becomes: What institutions have
the duty to minimize risk? The taxicab company placed its cab upon the street,
as it had the undoubted right to do. The household permitted the child to play
near the street, which was also proper. But both of these practices increased
the risk. The allocation of the loss to one or the other of these institutions
involves more than finding the risk-increasing institution; it involves a judg-
ment as to which of the two has the greater duty to reduce risks.70
It appears, therefore, that the general consensus in this area is determined
not only by factual observations of risk increasing behavior, but also by our
judgment concerning both the capabilities and proper role of the institutions
involved. This judgment both dictates our goals and limits our sense of rele-
vancy.
For instance, it is generally observed that business enterprise liability is
spread to its customers; but no significance is attached to the possibility that
household enterprise liability might be similarly spread. Yet, automobile in-
surance premiums are part of the household's costs; they are reflected in the
cost-of-living index.7 6 Organized labor has some power to pass changes in the
cost of living on to business enterprise. Escalator clauses do this automatical-
75. This passage ignores the negligence standard by which, according to current doc-
trine, the law attempts to decide which enterprise should bear the financial burden of the
child's injury-the taxicab company or the household. If this question is to be looked upon
merely as a financial matter, as the zone of risk theory intimates, the negligence standard
has little applicability. That standard measures individual blameworthiness. Since each of
the two estates has a number of beneficiaries, a standard which applies only to individuals
seems irrelevant. Of course, in some cases the fact that one institution contains a blame-
worthy individual should be determinative, regardless of financial considerations. Even
so, the negligence standard of individual conduct may not be proper. See text at note 86
infra.
76. Automobile insurance premiums represent .96 of one per cent of the cost of living
index. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TEcHiNIQuES OF PREPARING MAJOR BLS STATISTICAL SERIES,
BULL. No. 1168, at 75 (1952). Research has not revealed what fraction of this is liability
insurance and what fraction is collision, fire, theft, and other automobile insurance. Cer-
tainly it is a large fraction, though it may be less than half. In any event, the fraction of
the household's budget which is spent upon automobile liability insurance probably ex-
ceeds, or at least is not substantially less than, the fraction of business budgets spent for
products liability insurance. See note 65 supra.
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ly; and even where such clauses do not exist, it can be assumed that the mili-
tance of industrial unions varies with changes in the cost of living of their
members. In some sense, therefore, employers help spread the risk of their
employees' personal tort liability. Insofar as Labor Day automobile casualties
receive recompense, employers ultimately pay. Business payrolls are the ulti-
mate source of payment for household liability insurance premiums.
If the above observations do not ring true, that is in part due to the fact that
they run counter to the general consensus concerning the proper role and
scope of households as compared with business institutions. Business enter-
prise is generally considered to exist merely for the purpose of production.
*Any other values to which it may give rise-pride of craftsmanship, success-
ful careers, good companionship, etc.-are thought to be secondary. On the
other hand, the household is generally considered to be the institution in
which one lives the good life, insofar as that is possible. This is thought to be
true even for the breadwinner who spends almost half of his waking hours at
work rather than at home.77 The economic functions of the household are,
then, given a lesser priority than the economic functions of business enter-
prise. Furthermore, great importance is attached to the decision-making func-
tion of business management, and it is thought to be subject to more public
regulation than is the decision-making function of household management.
Thus, when a loss occurs under circumstances involving both a household and
a business, as in the taxicab-child example, we are more willing to attribute
the loss to the business than the household, though the loss in that example
was as typical of raising a child in a modem, urban environment as it was
of running a taxicab business. Both institutions could insure and thus avoid
the shock of the loss, but we prefer that the burden of insurance be a cost of
business rather than a direct diversion of funds from the estate dedicated to
the good life. Moreover, we are more willing to attempt to induce a change
in business practice than a change of household practice. We feel, therefore,
that if this risk can be minimized, business should do it. This leads to a con-
cept of institutional fault as distinguished from personal fault.
Leave aside the relative blameworthiness of the individuals who were prox-
imate to the accident-the business servant and the injured member of the
household. Compare only the relative blameworthiness of the management of
77. By this implied criticism of our attitudes I do not wish to intimate that the
no-dous, unpleasant, but necessary, tasks of industry can be made pleasant or fun, or that
all employees can learn to love their companies. This is no more possible than it is possible
to make housework intellectually rewarding or to eliminate unhappy marriages. But when
something is done to brighten the home, as for instance, the purchase of.a hi-fi set, it is
done in the name of the better life. On the other hand, the playing of music over a factory's
public address system is more often justified in terms of improving efficiefncy, much as
music in a hen-house is said to increase the production of laying hens. The personnel
manager may hail the playing of music because it will help improve employee relations.
But the company's concern for good employee relations is not primarily based upon the
fact that friendship graces the good life. The company seeks good employee relations to
cut down personnel turn-over and to decrease labor unrest, thus increasing production.
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the two institutions. Though each may have failed to take measures which
might have reduced the risk, we are likely to find the business management
more at fault, for business management is generally thought to be more the
subject of public regulation; and we are more willing to impose standards of
responsibility upon it.7s
These attitudes were formed as the modern technological age grew out of
a prior, pastoral way of life. On the one hand, the newer business institutions
were considered to be in some sense interlopers. They had to accommodate
themselves to the older institutions already upon the scene, including the house-
hold. On the other hand, the new dangers of an industrial society werd thought
to be different in kind from the age-old accepted dangers of disease, farm acci-
dents, etc. New dangers are often disassociated from similar old ones. The
recent increase in commercial air travel, for example, has given rise to special
air travel life and accident insurance; this insurance finds a ready market
among those who have no great desire to increase their general accident and
life insurance coverage. Similarly, industrial accidents, automobile accidents,
etc., have been thought to create new problems rather than merely to aggra-
vate old ones. When these attitudes were first formed, insurance was not gen-
erally available and households were not affluent. The new social problems
these losses were thought to present could not have been left to household de-
vices. They were allocated to the more affluent business enterprises associated
with them. This, in turn, helped formulate our concept of the proper role of
business; thus establishing norms which are now unconsciously invoked when-
ever we consider these problems.79
78. Professor Keeton has investigated this general attitude and has concluded that it
includes a consensus that an entrepreneur who embarks upon a legal, beneficial calling is
nevertheless considered to be at fault, in the moral sense of that word, if he does so with-
out the ability or intention of paying losses attributed to his enterprise. Keeton, Conditional
Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1959).
79. Even the concept of the proper function of the entrepreneur may be, in large part,
the result of particular industrial developments. Dean Smith hypothesizes a man, A, who
decides to enter the grocery business, borrows money from banker B, and rents a store
from landlord C. Though neither A, B, or C are judgment proof, he concludes that A
should bear the burden of enterprise liability. A has control of the business. Neither the
lease nor the promissory note give C or B such powers. Smith, supra note 1, at 460-61.
If, however, instead of the grocery business Dean Smith had picked maritime shipping
in his example, he might have arrived at a different conclusion. Admiralty law holds the
ship responsible, which is merely another way of stating that the judgment will be ex-
ecuted against the ship, and that its owner will be the one who suffers the main burden
of liability. Had A decided to enter the maritime shipping business, and had he rented a
ship from C, the parties would understand from the start that C was primarily liable for
losses legally attributable to the enterprise. A demise charter, which is functionally com-
parable to a lease, provides that the charterer (lessee) arrange indemnity coverage which
will protect the owner-lessor from such liability. However, demise charters are rarely
used, except by governments to obtain shipping or to put to use ships they own. Private
parties usually use time charters, which provide that the vessel will be at the disposal of
the charterer and sail at his bidding but the captain and crew will be hired by the owner.
See GILmORE & BLACK, ADolRALTY 204-19 (1957). In other words, the lessor of a sea-
[Vol. 70:554
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
These norms are now so strong that it would not be thought desirable to
reallocate the burden of the losses. Even though insurance is now available
and households are generally affluent enough to afford the premiums, the norms
require that business enterprise liability for such losses continue. Indeed, the
norms are so well accepted that enterprise liability is still being extended to
losses not easily distinguished from those which first molded the consensus.
In workmen's compensation the extension has been from accident to occupa-
tional disease, from injuries suffered while doing assigned tasks to horseplay
injuries innocently suffered, and then to horseplay injuries suffered by aggres-
sors. A trend in the opposite direction would do violence to the established
norms of business responsibility. And the problem of automobile accidents,
which often do not involve any business institutions but only family cars, has
been handled by analogy. Further enactment of owners' liability laws and a
trend toward the family car doctrine were avoided by the general insurance
practice of including an omnibus clause in passenger car policies. Now the
problem of the uninsured automobile is being tackled with financial respon-
sibility laws, unsatisfied judgment funds, and compulsory insurance.
All of this may be submerged when we seek grander solutions to the prob-
lem of shock losses in general. As welfare legislation expands to include medi-
cal care, the importance of this branch of law will certainly decline.80 But the
concepts which it has helped create will certainly continue long after, affect-
ing the growth of other fields of law. These concepts have already spilled over
into the labor relations field in the legislative repudiation of the Hearst case.8 '
The Cmnulative Reasons for Enterprise Liability
If enterprise liability is understood to be an outgrowth of current attitudes
toward business and household institutions, then it must be considered in the
going vessel understands that his function is something more than an investor. He does
not expect to relinquish complete control over the vessel. Tie fact that he cannot relieve
himself from legal responsibility for enterprise liability, therefore, accords with his ex-
pectation. Any attempts to change the law in this regard would run counter to established
norms of the industry and upset present, efficient working arrangements.
80. See CLARENCE MoR, s, TORTS 344-45 (1953). The assumption that we will seek
grander solutions to this problem is not based upon any feeling that the present solutions
are inadequate in the areas where they now operate. Undoubtedly they are inadequate in
many respects. But, even if these shortcomings are repaired, general welfare legislation
will probably be enacted to cure other social evils. These schemes will be comprehensive
enough, however, to cover those now compensated by enterprise liability. A federal medi-
cal plan, if enacted, will probably cover the medical expenses of traffic victims as well as
cancer victims. A college scholarship program can provide an education for the son of a
breadwinner who was killed in an airplane crash as well as the son of a man who has
deserted his family.
81. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)
(reversed by the Taft-Hartley Act § 2(3), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958),
excluding "independent contractors" from the definition of "employee"); see Steinberg
& Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 211 (1948), enforcement denied, 182 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1950).
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light of the many recognized functions of those institutions. The ability of
those institutions to spread costs is only one recognized function. Each insti-
tution is considered also to have a certain amount of sovereignty within a
limited sphere. Since managerial decisions can prevent losses by reducing
risks, the preventative function of enterprise liability is also important.
Of course, it does not have a preventative function in all contexts. Artemus
Jones has a cause of action, though nothing can be done, or is expected to be
done, to prevent his suffering inadvertent defamation.8 2 Moreover, in many
cases the effect of enterprise liability may appear to be unnecessarily cumula-
tive. Drivers who do not fear for their own safety are not worried by employer
wrath, the danger of liability, or insurance cancellation.8 3 Industrial accidents
interrupt production, an expense to be avoided whether or not liability at-
taches. Poisoned customers detract from a product's good will. These factors
decrease the need for legal accident deterrents, and they indicate that the law
cannot claim first place among the ranks of deterrent forces. But that does
not mean that enterprise liability has no deterrent function.
An unimportant case, Robbins v. Thies, 4 will illustrate the point. Plaintiff
was injured by a power company's wire, charged with 2400 volts, which was
down on the road. The wire had been knocked down by an automobile accident
in which one of the cars had hit the utility pole. The pin, which attached the
wire to the pole, had been badly weakened by rot. Shortly after the accident,
the operator of the substation which supplied electricity to the downed wire
was notified by phone, but the wire remained charged for some time there-
after. Plaintiff was driving down the road when he noticed the accident,
stopped to give aid, and was injured when he came in contact with the live
wire as he reentered his car, some 37 minutes after the accident and 28 minutes
after the substation operator was notified that the wire was down.
Who was at fault? The substation employee might have been at fault, but
maybe not. Perhaps it took considerable time to rearrange circuits so as to
deaden the wire in question without darkening such necessary facilities as
hospitals, etc. The company's inspector was negligent in not discovering the
weakened pin, if there was an inspector. If not, some superintendent was neg-
ligent in not hiring an inspector. Or perhaps the company's engineers, who
designed this particular line, were wrong in putting a wire so near the road,
or on a wooden rather than a metal pole. The case, then, has some similarities
to the trichinosis cases where the farmer, the packer, or the housewife could
have prevented the injury. The one important difference was that most of the
measures which could have been taken to avoid this unfortunate accident were
within the recognized jurisdiction of the power company. The substation
82. Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 21. Liability in
such cases can be justified because of its vindicatory functions alone. Clarence Morris,
Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REv. 36, 37-41 (1937).
83. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 558 (1948).
84. 117 N.J.L. 389, 189 Atl. 67 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937).
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operator, the line inspector, the engineer who designed the line, etc., were all
subject to the discipline of the corporate defendant.
Insurance, of course, minimizes the impact of the judgment in cases of this
kind. If the company were a self-insurer, its own funding procedures would
minimize the importance of the judgment. This does not mean, however, that
enterprise liability has lost all ability to induce safety practices.8 5 If this kind
of accident became part of a pattern because many road-side poles were
knocked down, or many rotted wooden pins failed, or downed lines were left
charged for a considerable length of time after substation operators had been
informed, some remedial action would be likely to be induced; and the cost of
judgments in these situations might be valuable incentive to induce that action
quickly. Even insurance may have some salutory effect upon safety practices.
Insurance companies select their risks with some care. This underwriting func-
tion may have important risk minimizing effects. The insurer may call for
remedial action when a pattern of accidents becomes apparent. It may employ
its own engineers to study the problem and require that their recommenda-
tions be adopted before the insurance is renewed. Similarly, self-insurers, in-
tent upon decreasing the amount they must fund, will be induced to take such
action on their own. And finally, the potential economic effect of the burden
of enterprise liability increases safety. As has been pointed out, this burden
can not only increase price, but it can also decrease volume. It may price some
hazardous practices out of a market. It will curtail the use of other hazardous
activities. The added insurance expense of trucking, for instance, may induce
entrepreneurs to be more careful in the management of their fleets of trucks,
making sure that the trucks are only used for errands which, in the light of
the expense, will be profitable, and thus decreasing the number of trucks in
use.
This is not to say that risk spreading is unimportant. In any specific case
not only is it important, but it is probably the most important function to be
served. Most cases arise, after all, in an environment already conditioned by
enterprise liability law. The safety measures that law can induce will probably
have already been taken. The usual case, then, is part of the irreducible mini-
mum of unavoidable accidents, given current knowledge and existing safety
techniques. All that can be done in such a case is to spread the already realized
loss. But if the case's pattern is repeated often enough, methods of reducing
risk may well be devised to break the pattern. Thus, the result of the Robbins
case, probably, was to discipline the substation operator. If enough similar
cases occur, the company will redesign its poles, develop circuit breakers which
will automatically deaden downed wires, or take some similar action.
Of course, the "reasonably prudent man" may appear out of place in this
context. At least, it is not a very helpful criterion. No reasonably prudent man
can distribute electricity. It is necessarily a team effort. A team's standard of
performance is not easily measured by comparing it to the efforts of a hypo-
85. See James, supra note 83, at 559-63.
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thetical individual. The negligence concept, therefore, may not be very useful.
Perhaps it should be abandoned in these cases. Even if such a change has not
occurred de jure, it may already have occurred de facto.8 6 This change,
whether explicit or covert, can be described as a change to "strict liability."
That does not mean, however, that it is a change to "liability without fault."
So long as enterprise liability retains its safety function, the question of fault
is important. The issue becomes whether conduct within the legitimate juris-
diction of the defendant institution is of the kind which that institution should
be induced to discourage. This, in turn, depends upon the general consensus
of the proper role and scope of the various institutions involved. Thus, in a
recent article advocating strict liability for manufacturers in products liability
cases, Professor James makes a strong case for dropping negligence criteria
in such cases. But he adds
[T]his does not mean that the maker would be held for all injuries caused
by his products .... [A] plaintiff must trace his injury to a quality or
condition of the product which was unreasonably dangerous either for a
use to which the product would ordinarily be put, or for some special use
which was brought to the attention of the defendant. These are the risks
and losses which may fairly be regarded as typical of the enterprise and
so fairly allocable to it. Further... plaintiff must show that this unrea-
sonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the maker's
hands.87
Though Professor James recommends liability without negligence, he advo-
cates liability based upon proof of unreasonable danger stemming from the
condition of the product while it was still under the manufacturer's jurisdic-
tion. He requires that the danger be a proximate cause of the injury, without
intervening meddling by retailers, and that the injury be of the kind which
could be anticipated. Negligence is gone, but fault has been retained under the
label of unreasonable danger.
The fact that some losses can be regarded as "typical of the enterprise"
does not, as Professor James intimates, lead easily to the conclusion that they
are "so fairly allocable to it."88 "Typical" as there used is not a statistical
word. As already noted, the insurance experience collected for some industries
is not credible. Experience covering the refining of over six million pounds of
sugar annually has resulted in fewer than 27 products liability claims in a four-
year period, or less than seven per year. Such accidents therefore, are "atyp-
ical." If, by chance, a nuclear power reactor goes out of control and blows up,
no one will have to consider whether this first example of such a catastrophe
86. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
87. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 TEN N. L. REv. 923, 926-27 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
88. "[W]hen it comes to a fire which spreads three hundred yards from a railroad
track, I have quite as much uncertainty in deciding whether it is 'typical' of a railroad
enterprise as I do in dealing with it in any other way." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MIcH. L. REv. 1, 31 (1953).
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is "typical" of the atomic power industry. It will at once be apparent that the
power company should be liable.89 The word "typical," then, merely refers to
the fact that the accident had important causal antecedents within the entre-
preneur's proper sphere of control. In many cases this means that the acci-
dent, insofar as it was avoidable, could have been avoided by safety practices
within the entrepreneur's institution. Except in those areas of the law which
have no safety inducing function, such as purely inadvertent libel, the word
"typical" refers to accidents which the entrepreneur has the jurisdiction to
prevent and which the law seeks to have him minimize. It is, then, another
reference to fault.
"Fault" as here used merely refers to conduct which we desire to discourage
and which we believe can be minimized by safety techniques within the recog-
nized jurisdiction of the institutional defendant. It means nothing more. It
has no moral connotation."0 But the traditional concept of negligence probably
has no important moral connotation either. The mere fact that an entrepreneur
can insure against enterprise liability, though not against liability for his per-
sonally committed assaults, indicates the different moral context of the kind
of fault in issue.91 The eminent authority of Holmes, speaking before the turn
of the century, reminds us that law borrows ethical words but uses them in
a nonmoral sense.92
It should be remembered that a rule of law can serve more than one pur-
pose. Clearly, the old action on the case had both the function of inducing
safety and of repairing the injured. A modern negligence action, if brought
against the actual tortfeasor, would have the same double function. Merely
because the law raises its sights to the tortfeasor's employer, we should not
assume that one Qf those functions is no longer served. On the contrary, the
law has merely appropriated the machinery of the employer's business enter-
prise to achieve the same purpose it would have had in an action against the
servant. We may observe that this machinery is more efficient for one of those
89. Furthermore, the power company will be insured. Kelly, Insurance Against
Nuclear Hazards, 1958 INs. L.J. 777.
90. See Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173,
1174 n.1 (1931).
91. This point is well illustrated in an enterprise liability context by the recent case
of Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
Plaintiff was a three-man partnership in the construction business. The partnership had
been held liable to a third person for an assault committed by one of the partners in the
course of his partnership duties. He had intentionally run down the third party with the
partnership's earth-moving machine when the third party had attempted to block the
progress of the machine because it was trespassing upon his land. The defendant insurance
company refused to pay the judgment. The policy included liability for assault and battery,
"unless committed by or at the direction of the insured." The court held against the in-
surance company. "Of course," added the court, "Alfred Malanga [the tortfeasor-partner]
should not individually benefit by our determination in this case. The issue of his liability
to the defendant insurer under its right of subrogation is not in any way affected." Id. at
230, 146 A.2d at 110.
92. Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
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purposes than for the other, but a suit against the servant would not have
served both purposes equally well either. Enterprise liability may change the
efficiency of the law, but it does not necessarily change the ends sought.
Since enterprise liability has safety inducing functions, repairative functions,
and perhaps even other functions, theories based upon only one of these are
likely to fall into error. A third Smith, Bryant Smith, has made this point so
well that there is no reason to state it anew. He reviews Baty's arguments
and Dean Smith's answer, concluding that the entire discussion is based upon
a logical fallacy.
[I]t is submitted that the practice, so widely indulged, of narrowing the
basis of legal rules ... is an artificial and unsound practice. A simplicity
achieved by so great a distortion of the truth comes too high. And the
further application of a rule whose development is guided by such partial
predication will sooner or later either deny its premises or go wrong. 3
The functions of enterprise liability can be stated only in the most general
of terms. It burdens the entrepreneur for a number of reasons and seeks to
achieve the many different purposes for which the actionable activity is con-
demned. The entrepreneur may then take such remedial action as he desires,
within the limits permitted by law. He may insure; he may sue over; and he
may take steps to avoid the recurrence of this kind of liability. It is his move,
and the law usually leaves the choice to him. The law can do this because the
entrepreneur is a simple man who seeks only to maximize profits and mini-
mize losses and who uses the resources of his enterprise to accomplish these
ends. Sometimes, of course, theory departs from the facts, 94 and we must legis-
late him back into existence, as with financial responsibility and compulsory
insurance laws. But when we truly find him, we use him fdr the ends of the
law. The discipline of his enterprise is brought to bear upon the issue of safety.
The resources of his enterprise must sustain the risk.
The entrepreneur theory, then, becomes an answer to Mr. Baty. He was
wrong. But in a sense he was right. He merely failed to recognize the dy-
namics of the situation. The entrepreneur's pocket is not a fixed sum, depleted
by the judgment. It is an ever changing mass of assets which he administers
for the greatest gain. Vicarious liability, like tax laws, rules of contract, and
statutes governing labor relations, is merely one set of the rules of the game
of business. It conditions the entrepreneur's efforts; it is a means of social
control.
93. Bryant Smith, Cumulative Reasons and Legal Method, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 454, 468
(1949).
94. See, for instance, Justice Shaw's assumption that the breadwinner, upon taking
a risky job, would see the need to provide for this risk and would, therefore, demand
higher wages. See text at note 70 supra. See also Professor Ehrenzweig's assumption
that the guest who enters a car garaged in a guest-statute state will adjust his accident




To be sure, it is one of the more clumsy means of social control 5 It lacks
the neatness of many of its sister controls. But even those controls which have
been hammered out by the legislature seem to work at cross purposes. In-
heritance and income tax laws not only serve equalitarian ends by reallocating
wealth, but also encourage oil wells and charitable gifts. Labor legislation not
only attempts to improve collective bargaining, but also seeks to inhibit the
growth of the communist party. Similarly, enterprise liability not only seeks
to ease the burden of some shock losses, but also encourages safe practices
and, in a society which considers business aggregates to be real, substantial
beings, may even satisfy a deep felt desire for revenge against such entities. 96
CONCLUSION
Risk Spreading as a Rationale for Enterprise Liability
The entrepreneur theory justifies vicarious liability, in part, by pointing out
that the entrepreneur cannot claim immunity from it on the basis of a Lockean
concept of property. It answers that his property is not being taken; rather,
an item has been added to his costs. If his market position permits, he may
spread this cost. If not, he must bear it himself, but that is one of the facts of
the market, not an intent of the law.
This answer is more than a semantic trick. There is real truth in it. But it
does not provide a sound premise for logical thrusts elsewhere. It is not very
useful in defining the proper extent of enterprise liability. Where other factors
are equal, it can point to the desirability of placing the burden upon a finan-
cially strong institution in preference to a weak one. It also stresses the im-
portance that the burden be relatively stable from an actuarial point of view.
On the other hand, a certain amount of chaos is tolerable. Most judgments
of enterprise liability are chance occurrences. If the law adds additional chance
elements which are of the same magnitude as those which govern losses gen-
erally, the entrepreneur can adjust to them. He can still expect that the total
cost will be close to an actuarial prediction.
Risk Spreading and Legal Analysis
Prescriptive answers to zone-of-risk problems, then, must be based in the
main upon other considerations. Its use in the frolic and detour problem does
just this. Dean Smith would have the law judge each case in terms of what
the entrepreneur would expect. As suggested above, this is tautological be-
cause the entrepreneur expects the law to judge his case as it has judged
similar cases. If rules of law have been determinative, he expects them to
determine his case; if the law has been doctrinally indeterminate, he expects
that chaos to continue. But furthermore, Dean Smith's approach asks the im-
95. See Clarence Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 IL. L. RiEv.
730 (1930).
96. See MEcHAm, AGENcY § 362 (4th ed. 1952).
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possible. It asks the judge or juror to occupy temporarily the entrepreneur's
shoes and to adopt the entrepreneur's normative concept of the proper scope
of business. The judge or juror cannot do this. He must necessarily use his
own concept of what the generally accepted norm is, and he will do so even
if he attempts to follow Dean Smith's advice. This approach, then, does not
obscure the real problem; it merely fails to illuminate it. Cases must be judged
according to generally accepted norms, and so long as these norms are used it
makes little difference whom the one judging momentarily pretends to be.97
Tests which appear to rest upon economic considerations prove faulty.98
Dean Smith missed the mark when he observed that employer responsibility
"for acts of his employees in no way connected with the enterprise would be
undesirable because it would result in including in the cost of production an
item which economically does not belong there." 99 A better reason might be
that such liability might induce employer attempts to improve domestic safety
practices among his employees-an extension of business discipline into house-
hold matters which runs afoul of current institutional norms. But, as can be
seen, the zone-of-risk analysis does not lead to false results in this area. It
merely fails to articulate the reasons behind them.
97. Note the following language from 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 1376-78 (1956):
[We are looking] for risks that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly
incidental to the enterprise he has undertaken. Now one of the purposes for such a
quest is to mark out in a broad way the extent of tort liability (as a cost item)
that it is fair and expedient to require people to expect when they engage in such
an enterprise, so there can be some reasonable basis for calculating this cost. And
while many things may enter into the matters of fairness and expedience ... fair-
ness probably cannot be altogether divorced from some kind of foreseeability. What
is reasonably foreseeable in this context, however, is quite a different thing from
the foreseeably unreasonable risk of harm that spells negligence. In the first place,
we are no longer dealing with specific conduct but with the broad scope of a whole
enterprise. . . .The proper test here bears far more resemblance to that which
limits liability for workmen's compensation than to the test for negligence. The
employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise 'out of and
in the course of' his employment of labor.
Clearly, the reason foreseeability is related to fairness is that it is unfair for the law
to treat an entrepreneur contrary to his reasonable expectations. He expects the law to
recognize generally accepted institutional norms. Insofar as the law and his expectation
reflect the same norms, he will consider the law fair. Since current institutional norms
give meaning to the phrase "arising out of and in the course of" business, the law which
is based upon those norms will not be unfair. Since these norms are not precise, there
will be cases in which they will not be very helpful; but by that very token their decision
either way will not be fair or unfair. Toward such cases the entrepreneur had doubt; he
had no expectation.
98. Douglas and Clarence Morris attempt to justify the specific line between frolic
and detour on the ground that the additional burden, even if calculable, would be too great.
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 594 (1929) ;
MoRms, TORTS 254 (1953). But, as Douglas admits, "the data for making exact measure-
ments are not available." Experience with the owners' liability laws would indicate that
enterprise can withstand the loss of "frolic" defenses in automobile cases.
99. See text at note 15 supra.
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In the choice-of-law field, however, the analysis does not work. Generally
accepted norms do not exist, so that when the problem is considered from the
entrepreneur's viewpoint, it is just as difficult as before. The fact is that con-
flict problems have not threatened to undermine the substantive law of torts
to any great extent. In some fields, such as divorce, forum shopping is com-
mon enough to present important policy questions. Though torts is not im-
mune from forum shopping, notably in FELA cases, most plaintiffs are shop-
ping for liberal juries, not liberal rules of substantive law. So long as a plain-
tiff from Mississippi can get to a Detroit jury he is happy. He rarely cares
whether the judge's charge embodies Michigan or Mississippi law. This kind
of forum shopping is only important in the big case, which means it happens
in only a small fraction of the cases. It has more effect upon the amount than
the chance of recovery, so that if it has any effect upon insurance rates, it is
likely to affect extended limits rather than basic limit rates. In other words,
it is likely not to have much effect upon any particular state's rates.
The choice-of-law problem becomes, then, a technical question-one which
litigants and judges must answer with some ease and certainty to permit de-
cision in individual cases. The place-of-the-wrong rule, adopted by the Restate-
meit,'00 is certainly arbitrary. Professor Ehrenzweig's basic rule that lex fori
be used 101 is equally arbitrary. But at least his rule would lead quickly to
decisions and would avoid the difficulty of a judge's unfamiliarity with foreign,
and sometimes exotic, law. Whatever rule is advocated, however, it must be
argued for on the basis that this is primarily a question of technique, not of
policy. It has yet to be shown that there is a danger of shopping for favorable
law in a sufficient number of cases to affect the quantum of enterprise liability
which entrepreneurs must sustain.
100. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
101. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MIcH. L.
REv. 637 (1960).
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